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ABSTRACT
I develop and estimate an integrated model of global climate and regional economies to
study international cooperation on net-zero carbon emission among sixteen geographic
regions. I find that achieving net-zero emission by mid-century reduces global social
welfare loss by up to 35%, accounting for the emission reduction cost. However, I
show that this international cooperation suffers the “tragedy-of-commons” problem
due to the positive externality of emission reduction policies. I then combine theory
and numerical simulations to study the effectiveness of trigger strategies and transfer
payments in resolving this problem. The results presented here, however, suggest that
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Despite the international consensus that it is necessary to mitigate climate change, we
have not seen significant progress since the Paris Agreement in 2015. We are still on a
fast track of global warming. In most scientific projections, increase in global average
temperature over the pre-industrial level will be at least 3 ◦C before this century ends.
To meet the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting temperature increase well below 2 ◦C,
we must have a deep cut in global greenhouse gas emission in the upcoming decades.
In the United Nation’s 2019 Climate Action Summit, the European Union (EU) made
an encouraging announcement: it plans to become the first climate-neutral continent
with a series of action plans called the European Green Deal1. The highlight of this
proposal is to cut greenhouse gas emission to net-zero by 2050. China recently2 has
also announced in the United Nation’s general assembly that it pledges to accomplish
the same goal by 2060. Despite ambitious goals of the EU and China, climate change
is still a global problem that needs a global solution.
Since the Industrial Revolution, carbon emissions have become the main force that
drives the changes in global climate. To analyze the incentives for and stability of global
cooperation on mitigating human’s impact on climate change, we must understand
how emissions affect the global climate and the associated economic consequences.
This fundamental requirement necessities the interdisciplinary collaboration between
natural and social sciences. In this dissertation, I investigate the economic incentives
for cooperation among sixteen geographic regions on achieving net-zero carbon dioxide
(CO2) emission by mid-century. This study is based on an integrated framework of





Through investigating this integrated framework, I highlight some of the challenges that
lie ahead of us on achieving net-zero global carbon emission.
In Chapter 2, I first introduce the climate-economic model. This model provides a
quantitative tool so that given the sixteen regions’ future emissions I am able to char-
acterize the future climate as well as the associated regional economic impacts. It links
the sixteen regions’ carbon emission policies to the climate and economic consequences
and serves as the foundation for analysis conducted in this dissertation. The model
and the calibration results presented in this chapter are based on the interdisciplinary
research project Climate Action Gaming Experiment (CAGE). It continues the line of
work of using integrated assessment models (IAMs) 3 to address questions related to
climate change. The most similar IAM to our model is the Regional Dynamic Inte-
grated model of Climate and the Economy (RICE) in Nordhaus and Yang (1996) and
Nordhaus (2010a). Although the main structure is similar, our model is different to the
RICE model in terms of the specific model components and estimates, and our climate
module is based on a series of studies originating in Singer et al. (2008). In addition,
while the current version of the RICE model uses quadratic functions with respect to
global mean temperature to estimate the regional climate change impacts, we developed
a more detailed model based on Anthoff and Tol (2014) and various other empirical
studies that allows us to closely examine climate change impacts across regions.
In Chapter 3, I formalize the strategic interaction among the sixteen regions by a
game-theoretic model. In particular, the strategic interaction studied here is modeled
as a dynamic game where regions determine their CO2 emissions reduction policies
over an infinite horizon. These decisions will affect the evolution of global climate
which in turn affects each region’s economy. I describe the approach so that these
economic impacts can be transformed into the perturbation on consumption for each
region. The incentives of the sixteen regions in the game are then guided by the social
welfare of consumption. Under a couple of simplifying assumptions, I characterize
an equilibrium that represents the outcome when there is lack of cooperation. This
approach continues the line of work that uses game-theoretic models to study the
strategic interaction of carbon emission policies4. The most similar models in the
literature are those in Dockner et al. (1996), Dutta and Radner (2009) and Dutta
and Radner (2010). Compared to these studies, the model presented here imposes
less restrictive assumptions while still allows for an explicit characterization of the
equilibrium.
3See Nordhaus (2013) for a survey.
4See Calvo and Rubio (2012) for a survey of this literature.
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In Chapter 4, I use the tools developed in the previous two chapters to investigate
the incentives for and the stability of international cooperation to mitigate climate
change. The main goal here is to show whether global cooperation can be sustained so
that the world accomplishes net-zero carbon emission by mid-century. I first show the
economic consequences for the sixteen regions as well as the implications for the climate
and global welfare if net-zero emission is achieved. Using the equilibrium character-
ized in Chapter 3, I formalize the “tragedy-of-commons” problem exhibited in climate
cooperation, in which each region provides insufficient emission reduction due to the
positive externality of reduction policies. I also show that stronger incentives for emis-
sion reduction can be provided if an international agreement of using trigger strategies
are adopted, in which the sixteen regions collectively punish unilateral deviation from
cooperation. Based on this insight, I use numerical simulations of the model to inves-
tigate whether trigger strategies can sustain global cooperation that achieves net-zero
emission by mid-century. I also discuss the cases when trigger strategies are used to
sustain cooperation among a subset of regions and when binding agreements are plau-
sible, respectively. The effects of potential altruism towards other regions and towards
future generations are also investigated. The qualitative feature of trigger strategies
here is similar to that in Dockner et al. (1996), Dutta and Radner (2009) and Dutta
and Radner (2010). The study presented here contributes to this line of work by test-
ing the effectiveness of trigger strategies in an integrated and empirically based model.
The results presented here provide additional insights for the policy-making decisions
regarding carbon emission reduction in the real world.
In Chapter 5, I study the case when monetary transfers among the sixteen regions
are allowed. In particular, I consider using monetary payments to encourage trading
carbon emission reduction and to encourage participating in cooperation with binding
agreements, respectively. The study of carbon trade investigates whether the sixteen re-
gions can reallocate the emission reduction burden more efficiently. I characterize each
region’s incentive for trading carbon emission reduction without emission allowances.
Based on this characterization, I then design a set of market rules to facilitate trade
among all regions so that it improves each region’s social welfare and the global climate
compared to the noncooperative equilibrium. In the literature, transfer payments are
often used to study the coalition formation on climate cooperation (Jørgensen et al.
(2003); Jørgensen et al. (2005); Chander (2007); Lessmann et al. (2015)). However, it is
challenging to conduct this type of analysis in a dynamic setting using the integrated
model presented here. In this dissertation, I thus focus on using transfer payments
to encourage global cooperation and impose the assumption of binding agreements.
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Studying transfer payments in this simple setting allows me to highlight some of the
potential issues for using transfer payments.
Through the study presented in this dissertation, I provide reliable estimation re-
garding the future climate and the associated economic consequences with and without
global cooperation. The discussion on using trigger strategies and transfer payments
to sustain cooperation provides detailed insights on the prospects of achieving net-zero
carbon emission by mid-century. The study presented here will help inform the policy





I begin by describing the integrated climate-economic model that serves as the foun-
dation for the analysis. It contains a global climate module and an economic im-
pact module so that quantitative extrapolations regarding future global climate and
the associated economic consequences can be provided given the future carbon emis-
sions. The model and the calibration results presented here are based on collaboration
with Nuole Chen, Chenghao Ding and Clifford Singer on the interdisciplinary research
project Climate Action Gaming Experiment (CAGE). This research project is ongoing
and new results are continuously incorporated.
The model focuses on the climate impacts caused by carbon dioxide emissions. It
runs in continuous time from the reference year t0 = 2020 to infinity, and in which
we divide the world into sixteen geographic regions (Figure 2.1). Throughout the
dissertation, I will refer to a benchmark called the “No New Policy” scenario. It
depicts a world in which carbon emissions follow the pre-2020 trend. In this chapter, I
will first describe the climate and the economic impact module individually, and also
discuss some of the key assumptions and challenges. I then use the this model to show
the climate and economic consequences in the “No New Policy” scenario.
To simplify notation, I will write a time-dependent variable x(t) simply as x when I
believe that the dependence on time is clear from the context. The term ẋ is exclusively
used to represent the first-order derivative of x(t) with respect to time. In addition, I
will use x(t) and xt to remind us whether the variable is endogenous or exogenous in
the context of discussion, respectively.
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Figure 2.1: Sixteen geographic regions in the climate-economic model. The list of countries
in each region is provided in Appendix A.1.
2.1 Global Climate Dynamics
We model the global climate dynamics by focusing on two variables that are directly
affected by carbon emission: the atmospheric carbon content ca in trillions of metric
tons (TtonneC) and the global mean temperature τ in Celsius degrees (◦C), each
measured as increments over their respective pre-industrial levels.
Emitted carbon that enters the atmosphere increases the carbon content level, while
the existing carbon content diminishes naturally albeit at a slow pace. This carbon
dynamic is captured by the carbon balance equation
ċa(t) =
(
α1 + (1− α1) ·
ca(t)










Natural clearance of CO2
, (2.1)
where Ei(t) is measured by trillions of metric tons per year (TtonneC/yr) and rep-
resents each region i’s carbon emission level at time t. The atmospheric retention
fraction in the equation is less than one because the upper-layer ocean absorbs a por-
tion of emitted carbon. However, as carbon content accumulates in the atmosphere,
CO2 concentration in the upper-layer ocean increases as well. This in turn lowers the
ocean’s ability to retain emitted carbon and thus increases the atmospheric retention
fraction in the future.
This carbon balance equation and its associated parameter values are based on
Singer and Matchett (2015). It reproduces well the results from a more complex four-
chamber carbon balance model used in Singer et al. (2008) and Singer et al. (2014).
We simplify the equation by omitting the comparatively small feedback effect from
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temperature that would otherwise slightly affect the atmospheric retention fraction
of emitted carbon. This simplification allows us to decouple the otherwise paired
nonlinear differential equations for the global mean temperature and the atmospheric
carbon content. It is worth mentioning that the long-term natural rate of decrease of
the existing atmospheric carbon content is qualitatively known to be very small but
the quantitative value is not precisely known. This parameter value can thus only be
treated as expert’s guess.
The dynamic of global mean temperature is modeled by a linear heat balance equa-
tion in which consistent change in temperature is driven by changes in the net incoming
radiative forcing of the earth. Carbon emission produces CO2 that, as a type of green-
house gas, has the property of reradiating outgoing heat energy back to the earth’s
surface and in turn increasing the net incoming radiative forcing:












The exogenous variable F in the above heat balance equation is the total radiative
forcing that accounts for those driven by other greenhouse gases, long-term variation
in solar irradiance, changes in radiative shielding of albedo due to land use changes
etc,. The dynamics of the variable F are characterized in Ding (2018) and the linear
heat balance equation is modified and calibrated based on Milligan (2012).
2.2 Economic Impacts of Climate Change
We choose Anthoff and Tol (2014)’s Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Dis-
tribution (FUND) model as the foundation for the economic impact assessment of
climate change. Our priority in constructing such an assessment is that it must be
sufficiently realistic based on current empirical evidence but also transparent enough
so that the model can be updated in future work in the presence of new findings and
evidence. Among various models reviewed by Stanton et al. (2009) and Gillingham
et al. (2018), many are too complex for our purpose except for the FUND model and
the Regional Integrated model of Climate Economic (RICE)1. Compared to the FUND
model, the RICE model takes a more reduced-form approach in which the regional
climate change impact on the economic production is described by a single damage
1The most recent version of the RICE model is described in Nordhaus (2010b).
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function in global mean temperature, atmospheric carbon concentration and sea-level
rise. The FUND model, on the other hand, provides a more comprehensive framework
where the overall climate change impacts are divided into smaller components which
in turn are built individually based on empirical and scientific studies. As pointed
out in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s fifth assessment re-
port, our “understanding of the regional nature of climate change, its impacts, regional
and cross-regional vulnerabilities, and options for adaptation is still at a rudimentary
level”2. The FUND model’s framework thus allows us to update each individual com-
ponent based on new findings and evidence without changing the entire assessment
model.
The economic impacts of climate change in our assessment model are divided into
eight categories: agriculture, forestry, water resources, heating-cooling-and-ventilation,
dry-land protection associated with sea level rise, coral reef loss associated with ocean
acidification, diseases, and storm damages. These economic impacts are mainly de-
termined by changes in the global mean temperature and atmospheric carbon dioxide
concentration < CO2 > in parts per million by volume (ppm), the latter of which is





Combining the FUND model and various other studies, we estimate and measure the
economic impacts of climate change as perturbations, in percentage term, on each
region’s total productivity.
2.2.1 Agriculture
Impacts on agriculture production consist of three parts: the impact of average tem-
perature on agriculture production hAG,τi,t , the adaption cost h
AG,τ̇ , and soil fertilization








The impact on agriculture production is assumed to be quadratic in the global












where the impact is measured in comparison to 1990. This treatment is consistent
throughout the assessment model. We choose the year 1990 as the base year because
the change in climate is comparatively small and steady before then and therefore the
associated economic impacts are negligible.
The agricultural adaption cost is mainly due to the limited farsightedness of farmers
to correctly anticipate the change in climate in order to adjust the corresponding







The adaption cost is constant if the rate of change in global temperature τ̇ is constant
over time. Any additional change in τ̇ makes the adaption cost moving towards a
new steady-state level. In this formulation, we assume that the time span for the
production techniques to be fully adjusted to the new climate condition is ten years.
The dependence on the square of τ̇ implies that both rapid warming and rapid cooling
have more impact than a gradual change in temperature. We also assume that the
rate of change in adaption cost ḣAG,τ̇ is zero in 1990 to serve as the initial condition.













The third impact term on agriculture production is the positive but saturating effect
of soil fertilization due to the increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration
< CO2 >:
hAG,<CO2>i,t = cr,4
ln < CO2 >t − ln < CO2 >1990
ln < CO2 >2020 − ln < CO2 >1990
. (2.7)










where yi,t represents region i’s per capita income at time t. This formulation assumes
that the share of agriculture production decreases as the region’s per capita income
grows. In the FUND model, the income elasticity is assumed to be a global constant.
However, data presently available suggests that these values differ substantially among
different regions. Therefore, we allow the income elasticities of the share of agricul-
ture production ζi to be region-specific and estimate them using log-linear fit to the
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FAOSTAT data3 provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations.
2.2.2 Forestry
Climate change impact on forestry affects consumer and producer surplus. This impact






ln < CO2 >t − ln < CO2 >1990
ln < CO2 >2020 − ln < CO2 >1990
. (2.9)
Unlike the case of agriculture, there is not enough evidence suggesting that the income
elasticity of the share of forestry production is region-dependent, and hence we follow
the formulation in the FUND model to convert the impact on forestry product to the










Climate change affects regional patterns of precipitation and evapotranspiration, and









(t−2020) τt − τ1990
τ2020 − τ1990
. (2.11)
Here, the exponential term represents the technological progress on the efficiency of
water delivery system and Pi,t represents the total population for region i at time
t. This economic impact of water resources is highly uncertain mainly due to the
uncertainty in the extrapolations of precipitation, evapotranspiration and hydrology
at regional levels.
We select the parameter values to match the FUND model with the exception of
the parameters for CHI, FSU, WEU and CEE regions where we have noticed anomalies
in the FUND model’s results. The FUND model shows a large and positive impact
from water resources for China, which would lead to an increase in overall GDP for
China when the global mean temperature increases as high as 7 ◦C. To avoid this
anomaly, the temperature coefficient for water resource impacts for China has been set
3http://www.fao.org/faostat, accessed September 11, 2017.
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to zero. We also set FSU water resource impact coefficient equal to that for Canada
instead of using the much more negative value in the FUND model. The coefficients
for WEU and CEE have also been set equal to those for the somewhat similar latitude
case of USA, while much more negative impacts would follow from the FUND model.
These adjustments do not provide an accurate estimate, but they avoid an otherwise
anomalous assessment of water resource impact for these regions. These parameter
values shall be updated once new studies and findings become available.
The impact hWTi,t measures the dollar-value cost. To convert it to the percentage









2.2.4 Heating, Cooling and Ventilation
Climate change affects energy consumptions for heating and cooling. While increase
in global mean temperature reduces the energy required for heating, it increases the







max{τt, 0}1.5 − τ 1.51990






The term yε8i,t in the above formula includes two effects. The first effect accounts for the
income elasticity of the share of energy consumption devoted to heating and cooling.
The second effect accounts for the improvement of efficiency in energy consumption.
Unlike the FUND model that assumes that this efficiency will improve indefinitely as
for water delivery systems, we assume that it will eventually slow down and the pace
of improvement is correlated with per capita income. The reason for this alternative
assumption is that the fossil-dominated energy sources are generally not treated as free
goods. For example, the ratio of energy costs to GDP in the United States declined
rapidly in the decade before 19904, following earlier transient price increases. This is in
contrast to water resources, which have often been treated as free goods apportioned
via rationing, an approach less likely to produce price-driven incentive for efficiency
improvements. Moreover, some energy systems have intrinsic physical limits that do
not allow for indefinite increases in efficiency. The parameters in this updated formula
are calibrated to match the results in the FUND model for global temperature increase
at 1990-level, 2020-level and 2◦C-level.
4https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36754, accessed December 30, 2019.
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Increases in the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration will also increase the
ventilation requirements. We assume that the cost of limiting human exposure to




< CO2 >t − < CO2 >1990






Here, the values for ci,10 are based on Bao et al. (2018). The income elasticity of the
share of this cost and its improvement on efficiency are assumed to be the same as the
heating-cooling counterpart.
2.2.5 Sea Level Rise and Dry Land Protection
We simplify the FUND model’s proposed impact formula for the sea-level-rise by fo-
cusing on the annual monetary cost for protecting dry land. We assume that these









The dynamic of sea-level-rise St is based on Grinsted et al. (2010),
Ṡt =
1.2(τt − τ1990) + 0.77− St
208
, (2.16)
with S1990 = 0 and S2020 = 0.136. To convert the monetary value to percentage change









2.2.6 Ocean Acidification and Coral Reef Loss
The FUND model addresses costs due to a global measure of species extinction with
increases in global mean temperature. This part of model is rather complex and is
insufficiently supported by empirical evidence. For this reason, we replace it by the
estimate of climate change damage on coral reef losses, which has been extensively
studied in the literature. This substitution is not meant to imply that species diversity
more broadly is not valued by human beings, but rather that the net cost of loss of
species diversity is difficult to estimate and to assign to different countries and regions.
Rather than address this problem here, it is left for future work of the present model.
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Increasing in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration changes the ocean surface
layer acidity. The change in ocean layer pH from preindustrial value is approximated
by







Based on Brander et al. (2012), the fractional loss of coral reef areas follows
Rt =
0.56 · pHt
1 + 0.56 · pHt
, (2.19)





where values for ci,12 are obtained by combining the estimations of coral reef areas and
value per square kilometer in Brander et al. (2012). Converting it to the percentage










The impact of climate change on diseases is mainly associated with the increase in
global mean temperature. We include impacts on mortality and morbidity caused by







We assume that the economic impact of both mortality and morbidity associated with
















 · τt − τ1990τ2020 − τ1990 e− 1ν13 (t−2020), (2.23)
where the exponential term of per capita income represents the global biomedical
progress and the values for ν13 are based on GBD 2016 Diarrhoeal Disease Collabora-
tors (2018). The impacts from diseases in general also decreases as a region’s standard
13
of living improves. This effect is captured by the terms containing the per-capita in-
come yi and the associated parameter values are calibrated against the results in the
FUND model for the year-2020 value.














where the global biomedical progress parameter ν15 is obtained from Our World in
Data5.
2.2.8 Storm
Climate change increases the intensity of both tropical and extratropical storms. In
contrary to the FUND model, we simply assume that the associated economic impact
in monetary terms is proportional to the global mean temperature increase, and then






· τt − τ1990
τ2020 − τ1990
. (2.25)
For tropical storms, we take the first order approximation for the damage formula
in the FUND model, as the damage impact is very uncertain for values of τ > 3 in
any case. For extratropical storms, the FUND model has impacts driven by changes in
atmospheric carbon concentration. However, since our assessment model is designed
to account for the possibility of implementing Solar Radiation Management which
would cancel radiative forcing driven by increases in atmospheric carbon content, we
thus adjust the formula so that the impact depends on the changes in global mean
temperature and then calibrate the model against the FUND model’s results.
2.3 “No New Policy” Climate Change Impacts
2.3.1 Global Carbon Emission
Estimating the economic impacts of climate change in the “No New Policy” scenario
requires us to first extrapolate the global carbon emission Ê based on the historical
trend. We divide the total carbon emission into that from land-use changes and that
5https://ourworldindata.org/malaria, accessed August 4, 2019.
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from industrial activities:
Êt = Êland,t + Êindustry,t. (2.26)
Historically, deforestation has been a significant contribution to carbon emission
from land-use changes. However, since the amount of forested land is finite, the total
emission from deforestation must decline over time. We therefore assume that the
cumulative carbon emission from land-use changes is characterized by a logistic function














The first term is the first-order derivative of the logistic function with respect to time
that represents the long term trend of emission from land-use changes. The second
term accounts for the observed short-term surge centered around 1993 in the data. This
equation is simplified from the one used in Ding (2018) by omitting the comparatively
small Gaussian term that represents the brief episode of land-use carbon emission surge
around the World War II, since we are not able to rule out the possibility that this
perturbation in the observed data may be caused by measurement errors during that
period.
We divide the industrial emission into that from the use of coal and that from the
fluid fossils, and extrapolate it using
Êindustry,t = gc ×
b31




(1 + e−(t−b42)/b43)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Emission from fluid fossil
. (2.28)
The parameter gc = 0.409 is the historical emission fraction from coal, which is assumed
to be constant over time. Rogner (1997) points out that depletion of fossil fluids
increases the associated extraction cost, which in turn may decrease global carbon
emission in the future if it follows the current trend. This depletion effect suggests
that the variable fp may decline over time depending on how fast the fossil fluids
depletes. Although we have explored this depletion effect along other lines of research,
here we assume that fp is fixed at 1 for the purpose of simplicity. Figure 2.2 shows
that the actual global carbon emission in the “No New Policy” scenario may be lower
than the extrapolated level presented here, although it has relatively a small impact in
the near future. Nonetheless, as shown in Figure 2.3, the extrapolated global carbon
emission is close to what is suggested in related studies.
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Figure 2.2: Extrapolated global carbon emission with (blue dashed line) and without (purple
line) the fluid fossil depletion effect.















Figure 2.3: Extrapolated global carbon emission under the “No New Policy” scenario (purple
line) compared to projection of IAM “marker” baseline scenarios (gray area, and blue dashed
line represents the average) in SSP database from Riahi et al. (2017).
2.3.2 Climate Change and Regional Economic Impacts
Following the current trend of carbon emission and using the global climate dynamics
described in section 2.1, Figure 2.4 shows that the atmospheric carbon dioxide concen-
tration will be twice as much as the level in the reference year before this century ends,
and the global mean temperature increase will surpass 2 ◦C, the temperature increase
limit proposed by the Paris Agreement, by mid-century and rapidly approaches 3.5 ◦C
by the end of this century.
The economic impact assessment model described in the previous section allows us
to transform these changes in climate into economic terms, measured as the percentage
impacts on productivity, for each of the sixteen regions. Recall that in the economic
16








































Figure 2.4: Projected atmospheric CO2 concentration (left) and global mean temperature
increase (right) for the “No New Policy” Scenario.
assessment model we need to take into account the per capita income yit for each region.
This variable in principle is endogenously affected by climate changes and the associated
economic impacts. Including this endogenous feedback effect in the economic impact
assessment, however, is very challenging. On the other hand, neglecting this feedback
effect has little effect on results presented here since the climate change impacts on
each region’s productivity are usually of magnitude of a few percents according to our
estimation, which is much smaller than the observational uncertainties in the economic
impact assessment model itself. We therefore assume that the per capita income yit
used in the economic impact assessment is










where the total productivity, without accounting for the climate change impacts, is





This equation, derived in Singer et al. (2008), is an analytic approximation for back-
ground economies that are presumably unaffected by climate changes. Since the climate
change impacts has been relatively small so far, we assume that the observed data on
per capita income is no different than that which would be observed from the back-
ground economy. Therefore, we simply calibrate the above per capita income equation
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using the historical data provided by Maddison6 and the International Monetary Fund7,
and use it in the economic impact assessment formula.
The economic impact assessment model also requires each region’s total populations
as inputs. We divide the regional population Pi into subsistence population, denoted
by B0,i and assumed to be constant, and the labor inputs, denoted by Li. The latter





This logistic function is calibrated using the long-term historical data on population
provided by Maddison combined with the projection provided by the United Nations8
through 2050.
Figure 2.5 shows the economic impacts for the sixteen regions in the “No New Pol-
icy” scenario from the reference year onwards. These impacts represent the inherent
effects of climate change on economic production according to our assessment model.
We can see that the current changes in climate are improving the total productivity
for some regions in the upcoming couple of decades. Most of these regions are tem-
perate regions that are experiencing increase in agricultural productivity despite other
negative impacts from climate change. This result is consistent with that found in
the current literature9. Beginning around mid-century, however, most regions will ex-
perience increasingly negative economic impact from climate change. The Japan and
South Korea region (JPK) suffers from negative climate change impacts only after the
end of this century mainly due to its ocean tempered climate.
The Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) region also experiences positive climate
change impacts for most of this century mainly due to the positive impact on agriculture
production, energy consumption on HVAC and water supply according to our model.
We, however, should take a cautious note that this finding seems in contradiction to
what is perceived in reality for the Australia and New Zealand region. This may be
due to the inaccuracy in the estimation of impacts on this region’s water supply. In
addition, we do not have a reliable model that captures how the intensity and frequency
of bushfires are affected by climate change and the associated economic consequences,
which have become more of concerns recently for the Australia and New Zealand region.
6https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/
maddison-project-database-2018, accessed August 22, 2019.
7https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx, accessed February 15,
2020.
8https://population.un.org/wpp/, accessed August 24, 2019.
9Tol (2018) provides a meta-analysis of existing climate change impact assessments.
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Figure 2.5: Estimated regional economic impacts from climate change, measured as percentage
term in total production, in the “No New Policy” scenario.
The economic impacts of climate change are specially significant for the two African
regions, the North Africa region (NAF) and the Sub-Saharan Africa region (SSA).
These regions are already hot and thus tend to suffer more from increase in the global
average temperature. In addition, many parts of these regions are economically less
developed and hence are more vulnerable to impacts such as those on water supply
and diseases. According to our extrapolation, these regions’ total population will be
growing rapidly during the remainder of this century. Therefore, the “No New Policy”
scenario is particularly concerning as a significant portion of the world’s population
will suffer a lot from the climate change impacts. To make things worse, this portion
of population is estimated to have lower-than-average per capita income in this century
and whose standard of living is very sensitive to perturbations in income.
Table 2.1 shows the climate change impacts in 2080 of the “No New Policy” scenario
for the eight economic categories. We can see that the dominant impacts by then are
those on water supply, HAVC and storm damages. On the other hand, the impacts
of climate change on agriculture and forestry are still positive for most regions. The
impacts of sea level rise and coral reef loss are negligible according to our assessment.
However, this result should be interpreted carefully. The economic impacts of sea level
rise are small because we have assumed in the model that each region rationally foresees
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Table 2.1: Climate change impacts (%GDP) of 2080 in the “No New Policy” scenario.
Agriculture Forestry Water HAVC Sea-level Coral-reef Disease Storm Total
USA 0.010 0.010 -0.080 -0.182 -0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.029 -0.276
CAN 0.072 0.002 -0.071 -0.219 -0.001 0.000 -0.006 -0.001 -0.223
WEU 0.024 0.004 -0.089 -0.429 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.493
JPK 0.019 0.007 0.000 0.060 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.011 0.072
ANZ 0.027 -0.024 0.000 0.023 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.005 0.020
CEE 0.039 0.010 -0.091 -0.242 -0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.000 -0.288
FSU -0.004 -0.003 -0.083 -0.591 -0.001 0.000 -0.046 -0.001 -0.730
MDE 0.018 0.000 -0.156 -0.622 -0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.000 -0.763
CAM 0.192 0.003 -0.166 -0.653 -0.002 0.000 -0.034 -0.045 -0.705
SAM 0.045 0.004 -0.176 -0.574 -0.002 0.000 -0.023 -0.000 -0.726
SAS 0.009 0.020 -0.145 -0.482 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.024 -0.625
SEA 0.008 0.018 -0.317 -0.867 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.010 -1.170
CHI 0.006 0.041 0.000 -0.893 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.009 -0.854
NAF 0.019 0.000 -1.016 -5.091 -0.001 0.000 -0.043 -0.000 -6.131
SSA 0.156 0.002 -0.404 -5.203 -0.004 0.000 -1.025 -0.004 -6.482
SIS 0.090 0.000 -0.167 -0.622 -0.002 0.000 -0.038 -0.154 -0.894
the rise in sea level and hence has been acting accordingly ahead of time. Therefore,
our estimation of sea-level-rise impact is entirely based on the monetary costs for
protecting the existing dry land. In the event that doing so becomes implausible and
reallocation of residences and businesses is required, the impacts will be much higher
than what are presented here. The coral reef loss represents only one of the economic
consequences due to ocean acidification. There are other consequences, for example
impacts on fisheries, that are not accounted for in our model. Finally, it is worth
noting that the impact of climate change on diseases is particularly high for the Sub-
Saharan African (SSA) region due to its tropical weather and relatively limited access
to medicine. Therefore, direct mitigation of climate change in terms of improving the
medicine accessibility is particularly important for this region.
I shall point out here that the current climate change impact assessment is illus-
trative at best due to limited data, strong modeling assumptions and lack of empirical
studies in some of the categories. Further work is necessary to improve the current es-
timation. In particular, although our assessment model includes technological changes,
for example the improvement in efficiency for water delivery systems, that will in turn
affect the future economic impacts, these technological advancements are assumed to
be exogenously given and are estimated based on current data. Given the increasingly
significant climate change impacts, it is likely that countries will invest more on the
relevant technologies and hence directly mitigate some of the economic impacts pre-
sented here. This is an important aspect for the economic assessment, but it is left for
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future work due to the complexity. In addition, although we measure climate change
impacts in economic terms whenever possible, there are some impacts that are difficult
to measure in this way and thus are not accounted for in the model. For example,
biodiversity may play an important role in the policy-making process but its economic
impact may not reflect such importance. In the current assessment model, the eco-
nomic impact of coral reef loss as the representation for the impacts on bio-systems is
negligible as shown in Table 2.1. This liklely underestimates the true impacts of coral
reef loss for the world. However, modifications at the current stage would inevitably
involve some subjective decisions given the existing empirical studies. Moreover, all
the studies we used in estimating climate change impacts are based on scenarios with
moderate increase in global mean temperature. It is difficult to tell what would really
happen if the temperature increase exceeds 3 ◦C. Hence, we should keep in mind these





The strategic interaction among the sixteen regions is modeled as a dynamic game in
which each region has the option to reduce its carbon emission from what is suggested
in the “No New Policy” scenario. Specifically, I will use N to represent the set of
regions, and the decision for region i at time t is to choose an emission abatement level
ai(t) ∈ [0, 1] so that region i’s actual carbon emission at time t becomes
Ei(t) = (1− ai(t))× Êi,t. (3.1)
where Êi is region i’s extrapolated carbon emission in the “No New Policy” scenario
and is treated as exogenously given. I implicitly assume that each region has perfect
control to accomplish the corresponding emission reduction target through the use
of region-wide carbon tax, cap-and-trade programs, Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR)
technologies, or policies that encourages production with cleaner technologies etc. In
addition, I also assume that a region’s emission abatement policy can only affect its
own carbon emission level and there is no spillover effect across the border, for the
purpose of simplicity.
In this dynamic game, each region has an instantaneous payoff function uit at any
given time t, the value of which is determined by the region’s own emission-abatement
level ai(t) as well as the state variables ca(t) and τ(t) that characterize the global
climate at that instance. The goal for each region i is to maximize its total discounted




uik(ai(k), ca(k), τ(k)) · e−ρ(k−t)dk. (3.2)
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The parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor which for simplicity is assumed to be a
global constant.
The selection of payoff functions is critical for the strategic analysis of this game.
In this dissertation, I will use two types of payoff functions. The first one is based on
the social welfare defined as the region’s total discounted utility from consumption,
which closely captures the overall economic impacts of climate change across time,
and therefore will be used as the benchmark in analysis. The second payoff function
makes some additional assumptions to simplify the first one. Although some of these
assumptions may differ from what we find in the climate-economic model, they allow
me to explicitly solve the game-theoretic model and thus to provide a more precise
discussion that would otherwise be very challenging to accomplish when using the
social welfare of consumptions as payoffs.
In this chapter, I will first estimate the cost of emission abatement policies based
on empirical evidence, and then discuss the computation of the social welfare of con-
sumption within the climate-economic model. Next, I will discuss the simplifications
that essentially transform the dynamic game into a piecewise linear one, for which an
explicit noncooperative solution will then be presented.
3.1 Cost of Emission Reduction
Reduction in carbon emission from the “No New Policy” scenario lowers the carbon





Achieving lower carbon intensity imposes costs on the economy. These costs depend
on the type of reduction policy selected by each region. For example, lowering the
carbon intensity can be accomplished by switching to non-carbon technology in energy
production or lowering energy demand either from consumer side or from improvement
of energy efficiency, etc. As pointed out in Gillingham and Stock (2018), estimating
emission reduction cost within each category tends to provide an inaccurate assessment.
For example, the policy that encourages purchase of electric vehicles may decrease the
gasoline fuel demand but increase the electricity demand, and the overall effect on
emission depends on the carbon intensity in the region’s energy production. For this
reason, I choose not to use the various engineering estimates of marginal abatement cost
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curves1. Instead, I opt for a more reduced-form approach in which I assume that the
region’s reduction cost can be efficiently determined if it adopts a region-wide carbon
tax or cap-and-trade program.
The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 bill (H.R. 2454)2 proposes a
nation-wide cap-and-trade program for the United States that intends to achieve 83%
emission reduction in 2050 from the 2005 emission level3. Based on the U.S. Congres-
sional Budget Office’s estimates4, the percentage change in U.S. total production for
adopting this cap-and-trade program can be approximated by the analytic function
β1 × ai(t)β2 , (3.4)
where β1 = 3.12% and β2 = 2.35. This estimation is based on available technology of
the United States in 2005. Acemoglu et al. (2016) shows that research subsidy and
carbon tax can encourage the production and innovation in cleaner technology, which
will potentially change future reduction costs. Nordhaus (2010a) implicitly assumes
perfect spillover across regions of this effect so that all regions’ reduction cost reduces
at the same pace. However, as shown in Harstad (2012), the spillover of innovation
in cleaner technology creates another ‘market-failure’, and without carefully designed
international contracts all regions will invest at suboptimal level in the cleaner tech-
nology. I do not intend to solve this problem here since it requires analyzing another
layer of strategic interaction on top of the decisions regarding emission reductions. For
this reason, I assume that innovations in cleaner technology will follow the pre-2020
trend so that the change in reduction cost for each region is proportional to its relative
carbon intensity of output in the “No New Policy” scenario. More precisely, the total








× ai(t)β2 . (3.5)
1US Energy Information Administration(2018): https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/








3.2 Social Welfare of Consumption
I modify the standard Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model5 by introducing climate change
impacts and emission reduction costs as perturbations to each region’s total production
function. Each region’s background economy has a Cobb-Douglas production function
with Hicks-neutral technological progress that takes labor and capital as inputs to
produce a single commodity. Each region’s total productivity Ai and labor input Li
are treated as exogenous variables while capital stock Ki is endogenously determined.
The climate change impacts Ωi and emission reduction costs Λi are then treated as
perturbations in the production function that in turn determine the actual output:
Yi(t)︸︷︷︸
Actual output
= (1 + Ωi(t)− Λi(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Climate-related perturbation
×Ai,tLωi,tKi(t)1−ω. (3.6)
Given the perturbed production function, each region’s economy optimally divides
the actual output between consumption, denoted by Ci, and investment in capital stock
in order to achieve maximal social welfare given the available resources. Each region’s
social welfare Wi is the total present value of all future instantaneous utilities, which
are proportional to the exogenously given population Pi and have diminishing marginal







1− θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Instantaneous utilities
e−ρ(t−t0)dt,
s.t. Yi(t) = K̇i(t) + rKi(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Investment




Calculating the sixteen regions’ social welfare requires us solving the optimization
problem (3.7) governing the consumption-investment decisions. Due to nonlinearity of
the climate dynamics and the complexity of the climate change impacts, it is difficult
to obtain an exact solution. I thus develop an approximation for the solution that can
be solved numerically. This method uses an analytic approximation for the background
economy derived in Singer et al. (2008) as the starting point.
Lemma 1 Suppose the consumption C0i is the solution of the optimization problem
(3.7) when there is no climate change impacts nor emission reduction costs, i.e., Ωi =
5Ramsey 1928; Cass 1965; Koopmans 1963.
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1−ωLωi,t − rK0i,t − K̇0i,t.
I combine the climate change impacts and emission reduction costs into a single
variable Di defined as
εDi,t := Ωi,t − Λi,t, (3.8)
where the sum of climate change impacts and abatement costs are represented in per-
centage unit, i.e., ε = 0.01. According to our assessment, Ωi and Λi are both relatively
small perturbations on the sixteen regions’ production functions. Therefore, this treat-
ment can help us keep track of the magnitude of error terms in the approximation.
Similarly, we can write the optimal consumption as
C∗r (t) = (1 + εγr(t))× C0r,t, (3.9)
and the associated capital stock as
K∗r (t) = (1 + εκr(t))×K0r,t, (3.10)
where γr and κr represent relative perturbations on consumption and capital stock,
respectively. Theorem 1 below characterizes an approximation for the optimal solution.
Theorem 1 The relative perturbation terms γi and κi can be approximated within the

































. In addition, supposing limt→∞Di,t = D̄i,
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we will also have the terminal condition
lim
t→∞
κ̇i(t) = 0. (3.12)
Proof. To simplify notation, we drop the region index from the variables. We can





































P θ(C0)1−θ · γ · e−ρ(t−t0)dt,
where the approximation holds when εγ is small.
To characterize the relative perturbation terms, let us define the Hamiltanian





where λ is the costate variable. If C∗ is the solution to the optimization problem and
K∗ is the corresponding state variable, then Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle implies
that there exists λ∗ such that6
K̇∗(t) = Hλ(C∗, K∗, λ∗);
λ̇∗(t) = −HK(C∗, K∗, λ∗);
C∗(t) = arg maxC(t)H(C,K∗, λ∗);
limt→∞ λ
∗(t) = 0,
where Hλ and HK are the partial derivative of H with respect to λ and K, respectively.
6The Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle is only proved for finite-horizon optimal control problems.
Here we assume that the solution to the original infinite-horizon optimization problem can be ap-
proximated as T → ∞. Tauchnitz (2015) points out that such direct application of the Pontryagin’s
Maximum Principle to infinite-horizon optimal control problems may cause issues in certain situations.
We do not formally tackle these issues since our primary concern is to characterize the perturbation
of the solution caused by climate impact D. This caveat is nonetheless pointed out here for future
work.
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and the third condition implies{
λ∗(t) = LθtC
∗(t)−θe−ρ(t−t0) , if λ∗(t) > 0;
C∗(t) = Y ∗(t) + (1− r)K∗(t) , if λ∗(t) ≤ 0.







= r + ρ− θL̇t
Lt
.
In addition, since the Euler-Lagrange equation must also be satisfied by the background














Notice that we have
Y ∗(t)
K∗(t)













· (1 + εDt − ωεκ(t) +O(ε2)),

















Combining these two derivations, equation (3.13) becomes
(1− ω)Y 0t
K0t












· (Dt − ωκ(t) +O(ε))
(3.14)
Similarly, the constraint in the maximization problem can be written as
(1 + εκ)K̇0 + εκ̇K0 = (1 + εD)(1 + εκ)1−ωY 0 − (1 + εκ)rK0 − (1 + εγ)C0.
Since this constraint also holds for the background economy, we have K̇0 = Y 0−rK0−
C0. Combining this observation with the above equation, we then have
εκK̇0 + εκ̇K0 =
[
(1 + εD)(1 + εκ)1−ω − 1
]
Y 0 − εκrK0 − εγC0
=
[
(1 + εD)(1 + (1− ω)εκ+O(ε2))− 1
]
Y 0 − εκrK0 − εγC0
= (ε(1− ω)κ+ εD +O(ε2))Y 0 − εκrK0 − εγC0.
Dividing both sides by ε, we have
K0κ̇ = ((1− ω)κ+D +O(ε))Y 0 − (rK0 + K̇0)κ− C0γ
= ((1− ω)κ+D +O(ε))Y 0 − (Y 0 − C0)κ− C0γ
= (D − ωκ+O(ε))Y 0 − (γ − κ)C0.

















Omitting the small error term O(ε) in equations (3.14) and (3.15) yields the equation
(3.11).
Since the total productivity and labor input are proportional to a logistic func-
tion that will approach a constant in the limit, we can see from Lemma 1 that
the background economy will approach a steady state in the limit. When we have
29
limt→∞D(t) = D̄, then we can rewrite equation (3.11) in the limit as{
γ̇(t) = Γ1 + Γ2κ(t);
κ̇(t) = Γ3 + Γ4κ(t)− Γ5γ(t).












The terminal condition (3.12) requires that the climate change impacts and emission
abatement costs eventually stabilize. Nordhaus and Yang (1996) and Nordhaus and
Sztorc (2013) assume that there exists a backstop technology with decreasing cost such
that production will no longer rely on the carbon technology around 2220. Although I
do not assume such backstop technology in the model, it is acknowledged here that the
world will eventually run out of fossil fuels and the carbon emissions will eventually
decline. In addition, as mentioned before, depletion of fluid fossil fuels increases the
extraction cost that in turn will likely accelerate the decline in global carbon emissions
even without the emission reduction policies. For this reason and for practical purposes,
I assume that the long-term climate change impact will be fixed as constant after some
finite (but large) time T if global carbon emissions have not achieved net-zero before
then7. This empirical terminal condition, together with the pair of linear differential
equations (3.11), allows us using the implicit Runge-Kutta method described in Press
et al. (1992) to solve the problem numerically.
3.3 Piecewise-Linear Formulation
3.3.1 Description of the Game
The piecewise-linear formulation of the game runs in discrete-time t = t0, t0 + 1, ...,∞
as it allows simpler proofs without the need for taking care of some of the technical
issues that would present in a continuous time analysis.
7The specific value of T depends on the context of analysis and is selected so that it has compar-
atively small effect on the conclusion.
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This version of the game contains two state variables, the time t and the level of
atmospheric carbon content cα(t). The evolution of cα in this formulation is simplified
to the transition equation






where rt ∈ (0, 1) stands for the atmospheric retention fraction at time t and the pa-
rameter σ ∈ (0, 1) stands for the natural diminishing rate of carbon content in the
atmosphere.
Each region’s payoff function uit at time t takes the form





(Ci,t − fit(ai(t)) · Ci,t)1−θ − git(ca(t), Ci,t)
]
, (3.17)
where the function fit accounts for region i’s emission abatement cost in terms of the
fraction of its total consumption; the function git represents region i’s utility losses at
time t due to climate change; the exogenous variable Cit is the consumption level of





δk−tui(ai(k), ca(k), k), (3.18)
where the parameter δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discrete time counterpart of the discount factor.
In addition, in this formulation I assume that
dfit(ai)
dai
> 0 and d
2fit(ai)
da2i




= hit(Ci,t),∀ca(t),∀t ≥ t0. (3.20)
The second assumption together with the linear transition equation for the atmospheric
carbon content imply that each unit of reduction in the global carbon emission at time







8For convenience, I drop the superscript 0 when the discussion is in the context of piecewise-linear
formulation.
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3.3.2 Discussion of the Assumptions
Recall that the dynamics of global climate in the climate-economic model also includes
the global average temperature τ , but it is not included as a state variable in the
piecewise-linear formulation of the game. This is due to the linearity of the heat
balance equation (2.2). Let τ̂ be the “No New Policy” global mean temperature and




“No New Policy” temperature
. (3.22)
Linearity of equation (2.2) implies










where ĉa is the “No New Policy” carbon content level in the atmosphere. Given the
actual atmospheric carbon content ca and the extrapolated “No New Policy” global
mean temperature from the previous chapter, we can first calculate the difference in
global temperature ∆τ by numerically integrating the above differential equation and
then obtain the actual global mean temperature τ using Equation (3.22). Therefore,
the atmospheric carbon content ca(t) is sufficient to determine the global average tem-
perature τ(t) at time t.
The transition equation (3.16) is simplified from the carbon balance equation (2.1)
for which an additional simplifying assumption is imposed.
Assumption 1 The evolution of the atmospheric carbon content at any time t is ap-
proximately linear at each time t. In particular, I assume
α1 + (1− α1) ·
ca(t)
ca(t) + α2 · α3
≈ α1 + (1− α1) ·
ĉa(t)
ĉa(t) + α2 · α3
= rt,∀ca(t),∀t ≥ t0.
The justification for this assumption is based on the empirical observation that the
cumulative effect of emission abatement policies on the atmospheric carbon content
in the near future may be relatively small so that the atmospheric retention fraction
of emitted carbon approximately equals the one in the “No New Policy” scenario.
For a demonstration, Figure 3.1 shows the extrapolated atmospheric carbon content
studied in Chen et al. (2020) under “No New Policy” scenario versus the cases where
the Western Europe region (WEU) either implements (i) the Rigid abatement where it
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: No emission abatements; : Rigid abatement; : Flexible abatement
Figure 3.1: Extrapolated atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration under (1) no emission-
abatements; (2) Rigid abatement for the Western Europe region; (3) Flexible abatement for
the Western Europe region. The figure is from
linearly increases its abatement level to one before 2050 and keeps it at one thereafter,
or (ii) the Flexible abatement where it implements similar policy but sets the target
abatement level to 0.67. For a region that currently accounts for around 10.5% of
global carbon emission, the cumulative effect on the atmospheric carbon content by
adopting either of these two emission abatement policies is relatively small in the near
future as shown in the figure. However, this assumption becomes questionable in the
more distant future and/or when all regions choose relatively high levels of emission
abatement rates.
Based on the estimation in the climate-economic model, the total perturbation
of climate change impacts and emission reduction costs on economic production is
usually of a magnitude of a few percents. Therefore, we can conduct linearization for










1−θ · γi(t) · e−ρ(t−t0)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Changes of social welfare in the game
. (3.24)
In equation (3.24), W 0i is region i’s social welfare from the background economy and
is treated as exogenously given. Using the numerical approximation in Theorem 1, we
can see that the overall perturbation γi is additively separable and can be decomposed





i (t) + γ
Λ
i (t). (3.25)
Combining equation (3.24) and equation (3.25), we can write the instantaneous utility






































git(ca(t), Ci,t) := −ε(1− θ)(C0i,t)1−θγΩi (t). (3.28)
From this transformation, we can verify that condition (3.19) holds based on the esti-
mated emission reduction cost as described in Section 3.1. In similar games of climate
change mitigation such as those in Dutta and Radner (2009) and Dutta and Radner
(2012), linear assumptions regarding the climate change impacts are made so that the
game can be solved analytically. However, this type of assumptions is too strong and
does not reflect the consensus of the scientific community, which is that we will face
an increasingly negative impact from climate change if actions are not taken now. To
balance between the complexity of the model and the empirical evidence, I relax the
assumption by assuming that the marginal utility loss of climate change is linear in
time t but can change over time.
Assumption 2 Impacts of climate change at time t is approximately linear in the
atmospheric carbon content. In particular, I assume there exists a sequence (γ̄i,t)t=t0,...,∞
for each region i such that
∂γΩi (t)
∂ca
≈ γ̄i,t,∀ca(t),∀t ≥ t0.
Condition (3.20) in the piecewise-linear formulation holds under this assumption which
can partly be justified by similar reasons for Assumption 1. The same caveat should
also be noted here: this assumption will be questionable in the more distant future
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and/or when all regions choose relatively high levels of emission abatement.
3.4 The “No Coordination” Outcome
The key lesson we have learned from the Kyoto Protocol is that any attempt for
global cooperation on mitigating climate changes is unlikely to succeed if it is not in
each region’s best interest to do so. Therefore, I am interested in characterizing the
outcome that arises from the sixteen regions’ strategic interaction. In this section, I
study an equilibrium of the piecewise-linear game that in my view represents the more
likely outcome when there is a lack of cooperation among regions.
In this dynamic climate game, a game history at at time t is a record of ev-
ery region’s abatement levels from the reference time t0 up until time t − 1, i.e.,
at := ((ai(t0))i∈N , ..., (ai(t − 1))i∈N). Each region chooses its abatement level based
on different game histories that could have occurred previously. More formally, I focus
on each region’s choice of strategies αi such that αi(a
t) ∈ [0, 1] represents region i’s
choice of emission abatement level at time t following the game history at. We say
the strategy profile α := (αi)i∈N forms a Nash equilibrium if no region can increase
its total discounted payoff by unilaterally choosing a different strategy. A sequence of
game histories will be realized when all regions follow the equilibrium strategy profile
to choose their emission abatement levels and is called the equilibrium path. Deviations
at any time will lead the game to a different path, but the concept of Nash Equilibrium
does not impose restrictions on the continuation strategies following these deviating
paths. Therefore, I will use a solution concept that imposes a stronger condition for
the strategy profile to be an equilibrium. In particular, we say the profile of strategies
α forms a subgame perfect equilibrium if following any game history the continuation
strategies prescribed in α forms a Nash equilibrium of the remaining game.
Since each region’s strategy in the game will select an emission-abatement level
based on the game history, the decision made by a region at time t affects the game
histories for all future periods, which in turn may change the abatement levels selected
by other regions from time t + 1 onward. When a region makes decisions strategi-
cally, this effect should be taken into consideration. Theorem 2 below shows that
there exists an equilibrium in the piecewise linear formulation such that even after
the above-mentioned consideration each region’s equilibrium strategy will select its
emission abatement levels based on time only.
Theorem 2 In the piecewise-linear formulation of the dynamic game, there exists a
subgame perfect equilibrium α = (αi)i∈N where at any time t and after any game history
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at, we have αi(a
t) = āi(t) for each region i where āi(t) is the solution of
P θi,t[Ci,t − fit(āi(t))Ci,t]−θf ′it(āi(t))Ci,t = Êi,tBi,t. (3.29)
Proof. Fix any game history at. We need to show that region i does not have an
incentive to unilaterally change its continuation strategy. By the One-shot Deviation
Principle, we only need to show that region i does not have incentive to change its
strategy at time t while maintaining the future continuation strategy, or equivalently
we need to show





 ca(t+ 1) = rt ·
[∑
j 6=i(1− āj(t))× Êj,t
]
+ rt(1− ai(t))Êi,t + σcα(t);




+ σcα(l),∀l ≥ t+ 1.












The proof is completed by using the payoff function defined in (3.17) in the above first
order condition, and the second order sufficient condition is satisfied since the function
fi is strictly convex.
The emission abatement level āi(t) characterized in equation (3.29) balances the
current abatement cost and the future benefit of improved climate - an abatement
level that would be chosen at time t even if region i didn’t consider the strategic ef-
fect of its own decision on other regions’ future choices. Recall that in a subgame
perfect equilibrium each region does not have incentive to unilaterally deviate from
the equilibrium strategy following any game history. Theorem 2 thus indicates that it
is not necessary for each region to use a more complex strategy in equilibrium. For
example, the United States may expect that China will take more actions in reducing
carbon emissions only if U.S. is also planning to do so, and hence will carefully selects
its own emission abatement policy accordingly. However, this type of expectation is
often conveyed from a certain level of coordinate move, through bilateral negotiation,
international treaties, etc, which will be modeled explicitly in the subsequent chapters.
Therefore, the equilibrium characterized in Theorem 2 in my view is close to the out-
come when there is no coordination of any level among regions to tackle the climate
change problem. In addition, Corollary 1 below shows that the strategy prescribed in
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Theorem 2 is each region’s unique best response as long as other region’s strategies
only depend on time.
Corollary 1 For each region i, if all other regions’ strategies are history-independent,
i.e., there exists an emission abatement level aj(t) for each region j 6= i at time t
such that after any game history at we have αj(a
t) = aj(t), then the strategy αi that
maximizes region i’s total discounted payoff is to let
αi(a
t) = āi(t),∀at,
where the emission abatement level āi(t) is the solution of equation (3.29) in Theorem
2.
Proof. The proof is done by simply replacing the emission abatement level āj(t) in






In the United Nation’s 2019 Climate Action Summit, the European Union (EU) made
an encouraging announcement: it plans to become the first climate-neutral continent
with a series of action plans called the European Green Deal1. The highlight of this
proposal is to cut greenhouse gas emission to net-zero by 2050. China recently has also
announced in the United Nation’s general assembly that it pledges to accomplish the
same goal by 2060. Despite these inspiring plans, the problem of climate change is still
a global issue that requires participation of all countries. In this chapter, I will use
the climate-economic and game-theoretic model to show the benefits and challenges of
forming international agreements on climate cooperation.
I will begin by examining the scenario in which all sixteen regions follow the lead of
European Union to accomplish net-zero emissions by mid-century. This scenario may
not characterize the likely outcome of the future if it is not in each region’s best interests
to achieve net-zero emissions. Using the “No Coordination” outcome characterized in
the previous chapter, I will formally show that the tragedy of commons exists in our
dynamic game and hence each region may lack economic incentives to accomplish net-
zero emissions without careful coordination. In the remainder of this chapter, I will then
use both theory and numerical simulations to investigate whether global cooperation
can be sustained by using trigger strategies, an approach that is commonly proposed
in the game-theoretic literature.
1https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal en.
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4.1 The Global Green Deal
I use the European Green Deal as the leading example and show the economic conse-
quences when all sixteen regions follow the same plan to achieve net-zero emission by
mid-century, which I call the Global Green Deal. Besides the highlighted target of net-
zero emission in 2050, the European Green Deal also intend to achieve 40% of emission
reduction from its 2020 level in the next decade. It suggests that the emission reduction
rate for European Union will increase at a faster pace in the early stage and slow down
when it approaches one. Based on simulations of the climate-economic model, this type
of emission reduction path is economically beneficial. The main reason is that emission
reduction cost is highly convex in the abatement rate but has a long-lasting impact on
the global climate. A faster pace of reducing emission at the early stage in general can
thus achieve higher level of climate change mitigation at relatively low costs. Figure
4.1 shows the emission abatement policy that would accomplish the targets set by the
European Green Deal. This abatement policy will be used for all sixteen regions as
benchmark in the Global Green Deal.









Figure 4.1: Emission reduction rates, relative to “No New Policy”, for the Global Green Deal
We can see in Figure 4.2 that the Global Green Deal limits the global average
temperature increase at just below 2 ◦C as targeted by the Paris Agreement. For a
comparison, if we postpone achieving net-zero emission till the end of this century,
then global average temperature increase will be stabilized at around 2.7 ◦C instead.
The associated economic impacts of the Global Green Deal are shown in Figure 4.3.
We can see that all regions will have significantly less economic impacts from climate
change by the Global Green Deal. However, most regions experience more negative
impacts on economic production in the upcoming decades due to the emission reduction
costs. We can also see that the benefits of the Global Green Deal will be upon future























































Figure 4.2: Projected global temperature increase (left) and atmospheric CO2 concentration
(right) under “No New Policy” Scenario (purple), net-zero emission by 2050 (green) and
net-zero emission by 2100 (blue).
“No New Policy” scenario before this century ends, while the remaining regions will
starts experiencing increase in economic production later on.






















































































































































































Figure 4.3: Regional economic impacts, measured as percentage term in total production, in
(i) “No New Policy” scenario (purple), (ii) under the Global Green Deal without accounting
for reduction costs (green dashed), (iii) under the Global Green Deal with reduction costs
(blue).
To answer whether the recent plans for net-zero emission are driven by economic
incentives, we need to compute each region’s social welfare of consumption. Doing so
allows us to compare the sacrifices in economic production in the upcoming decades
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against the benefits of improved climate afterwards in a way that is consistent with the
consumption-investment decision for the overall economic growth. Table 4.1 shows the
computed social welfare losses for the sixteen regions in the “No New Policy” scenario
versus by the Global Green Deal. We can see that impacts on the social welfare, in the
“No New Policy” scenario, are much higher for the economically less developed regions.
This is because these regions’ economic productions rely more upon natural resources,
thus is more vulnerable to climate change. In addition, it is harder for these regions to
adapt to climate change since direct mitigations are more expensive for them, which is
captured in our climate change impact assessment2. For the same reason, the benefit
of the Global Green Deal leans heavily towards the developing regions.
Table 4.1: Social welfare loss: No New Policy versus Global Green Deal
No New Policy Global Green Deal No New Policy Global Green Deal
United States 0.08% 0.44% Central America 0.30% 0.31%
Canada 0.07% 0.84% South America 0.27% 0.20%
Western Europe 0.18% 0.52% South Asia 0.26% 0.28%
Japan and South Korea -0.03% 0.22% Southeast Asia 0.45% 0.36%
Australia and New Zealand -0.02% 0.54% China Plus 0.20% 0.19%
Central and Eastern Europe 0.09% 2.33% North Africa 2.71% 1.69%
Former Soviet Union 0.27% 1.17% Sub-Saharan Africa 3.73% 1.78%
Middle East 0.30% 0.47% Small Island States 0.34% 0.24%
Note: The social welfare losses are measured as fractions of those from the background economy. Japan and South Korea (JPK) and
Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) have higher social welfare under “No New Policy” scenario than that of the background economy,
and hence the corresponding social welfare losses are negative.
Table 4.1 also suggests that China’s net-zero-emission pledge is supported by eco-
nomic incentives if China expects that its action will inspire more countries to take
concrete actions against climate change. However, the European Green Deal can hardly
be justified purely by economic incentives. We can see that the European Union will
suffer much higher social welfare loss for implementing the Green Deal even if it can
encourage global participation3. We will, in the subsequent sections, investigate other
strategic reasons for the European Union to be the first to announce the Green Deal
plan.
I have three comments for the result presented here. The first is that although we
measure benefits of improved climate by economic terms whenever possible, there are
benefits that are difficult to measure in this way and thus are not accounted for in the
model. The European Union would have more reason to support the Global Green Deal
2For example, increase in global temperature may increase the mortality and morbidity rate of
diarrhea. While it is easy for the developed regions to directly mitigate this impact, the same can not
be said for the less developed regions.
3Similar comment can be made for the United States, which has recently announced its intention
to achieve net-zero emission by 2050 under President Biden’s administration.
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if those benefits were included. Secondly, all the studies we found in estimating the
climate change impacts are based on scenarios with moderate increase in global average
temperature. There is much less uncertainty regarding the social welfare impacts of the
Global Green Deal as it limits the global temperature increase under 2 ◦C in contrast to
the “No New Policy” scenario in which the global temperature increase will be higher
than 3 ◦C by 2100 and keep rising. Therefore, a risk-averse policy maker may indeed
find the outcome in the Global Green Deal preferable. Last but not the least, the value
of social welfare is sensitive to the value of discount factor. Although our economic
model makes inter-temporal comparison of utilities consistent with that for the overall
economic growth, it is not unlikely that the European Union’s policy makers care more
about the future generations and thus the European Union should be assigned a lower
discount factor than what is suggested in our model. All these three arguments may
help support the European Green Deal in contrast to what is suggested here.
In our model, the social welfare for each region is defined in a way such that it is

































Figure 4.4: Relative global welfare losses of that in the “No New Policy” scenario under
different terminal rates for the Global Green Deal (blue line). The terminal reduction rate
indicates when the emission reduction rate stops increasing and the reduction level being
maintained thereafter. The maximum global welfare is achieved when emission reduction
terminates at 0.88 (red dot).
Figure 4.4 shows that halting further progress when the emission reduction rate
reaches 0.88 and maintaining it at that level thereafter yields the minimum global
welfare loss. On the other hand, achieving net-zero emission by mid-century is still
justifiable from the global perspective: compared to that in the “No New Policy” sce-
nario, the Global Green Deal can reduce global welfare loss by 35%. In addition, the
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Global Green Deal can stabilize the climate so that the increase in global mean tem-
perature is limited below 2 ◦C. With this global effort, the world will not advance into
the regime of significant changes in climate, for which there are still a lot uncertainties
regarding the economic impacts as well as the earth’s climate system.
4.2 The Tragedy of Commons
I use the piecewise-linear formulation of the dynamic game to formally demonstrate
the tragedy of commons underlying global climate cooperation. In climate economics,
the global optimum is usually defined as a profile of emission abatement policies that
is Pareto efficient, i.e., the emission abatement levels that maximizes∑
i∈N
xi × Ui(t0),
where the parameters (xi)i∈N ∈ (R+)|N | with
∑
i∈N xi = 1 can be interpreted as welfare
weights assigned to each region. To account for fairness among regions these weights
in practice are often selected based on each region’s relative total production level,
population, per capita consumption, etc. The values of these variables keep changing
over time and hence we may want to change the welfare weights accordingly. For
this consideration, the global optimum here is defined with respect to a sequence of
time-dependent welfare weights (x := (xit)i∈N,t≥t0) and is required to be sequentially
Pareto-efficient.
Definition 1 A collection of regional emission abatement policies (âi(t))i∈N,t≥t0 is se-
quentially Pareto-efficient if it is Pareto efficient at each time t, i.e., there exists a
vector of welfare weights xt = (xit)i∈N ∈ (R+)|N | at time t with
∑
i∈N xit = 1 such that





Theorem 3 below provides a necessary and sufficient condition that can be used to
compute the globally optimal emission abatement levels.
Theorem 3 In the piecewise-linear formulation of the dynamic game and given the
welfare weights x ∈ (R+)|N |×∞, a collection of regional emission-abatement levels
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(âi(t))i∈N,t≥t0 is sequentially Pareto-efficient if for any i ∈ N and any t ≥ t0:










Proof. Fix any welfare weights x = (xit)i∈N,t≥t0 ∈ (0, 1)|N |×∞. By the Principle of
Optimality in dynamic programming, the globally optimal emissions abatement levels
(âi(t))i∈N,t≥t0 can be characterized by solving the Bellman equation
Φ[cα(t), t] := max(ai(t))i∈N
∑
i xit × ui(ai(t), cα(t), t) + δΦ[cα(t+ 1), t+ 1].









= 0,∀i ∈ N.
Based on the transition function defined in (3.16) and the payoff function defined in
(3.17), we have
P θi,txit[Ci,t − fit(âi(t)Ci,t]−θf ′i(âi(t))Ci,t = δrtÊi,t ·
∂Φ[cα(t+ 1), t+ 1]
∂cα(t+ 1)
.
Notice that the solution to the above equation does not depend on the current level of
cα(t). Applying this observation to all future time k ≥ t+ 1, we thus have













Condition (4.2) in the theorem is then derived by using equation (3.20). The second
order sufficient condition is also satisfied due to convexity of fit, and thus we are done.
Since the function fit is strictly convex for each i ∈ N , equation (4.2) that charac-
terizes the global optimum has at most one solution. The left-hand side of this equation
is the marginal utility cost of region i’s emission abatement while the right-hand side is
the marginal benefit for the entire world. When equation (4.2) does not have a solution
then either the marginal cost is greater than the marginal benefit at any abatement
level and thus we must have âi(t) = 0, or the reverse is true and then we must have
âi(t) = 1.
The global optimum balances costs and benefits of regional emission abatement
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policies from the global perspective. This approach is different than the one currently
used in global climate debates where the goal is often to set the temperature rise at
a target level. For example, the Paris Agreement aims at keeping the global tem-
perature rise from the pre-industrial level well below 2 ◦C in this century. When the
welfare weights are set equal across regions and across time, then the profile of emission
abatement policies (âi(t))i∈N,t≥t0 will be the unique policy profile that maximizes the
global welfare W as defined in the previous section. Although I have not yet solved the
computational issues for computing this profile of abatement policies, Theorem 2 and
Theorem 3 together can be used to show the tragedy-of-commons problem. Before we
compare the global optimum and the outcome characterized in Theorem 2, a similar
statement to that for equation (4.2) can be made here for equation (3.29): it has at
most one solution and in cases where this equation does not have a solution we either
have āi(t) = 0 or āi(t) = 1.
Corollary 2 Given the welfare weights x ∈ (R+)|N |×∞, assuming both equation (4.2)
and (3.29) have solutions in the interval (0, 1) for some i ∈ N at time t, we have
āi(t) < âi(t).
Proof. Fix any welfare weights x = (xit)i∈N,t≥t0 ∈ (0, 1)|N |×∞. Let us first define
Ai(ai(t)) := P θi,t[Ci,t − fit(ai(t))Ci,t]−θf ′i(ai(t))Ci,t.

























In addition, for any a ∈ [0, 1] we have
dAi(a)
da
= P θi,t(−θ)[Ci,t − fit(a)Ci,t]−θ−1(−(f ′it(a)Ci,t)2)
+ P θi,t[Ci,t − fit(a)Ci,t]−θ(f ′′it(a)Ci,t)
> 0.
Therefore, we must have âi(t) > āi(t), and hence we are done.
Corollary 2 shows that in the “‘No Coordination”’ outcome each region’s abatement
levels are strictly lower than the globally optimal ones across time. The essence of this
problem is that in the “‘No Coordination”’ outcome, each region’s emission abatement
level only balances the marginal reduction cost and the region’s own marginal benefits,
in contrast to the global optimal outcome where it is balanced to marginal benefit for
the entire world.
In addition, we can recall from Corollary 1 that the equilibrium strategy in the “No
Coordination” outcome is the unique best response strategy for each region when other
regions’ selections of abatement levels are not contingent on the game history. When
we take a closer look at the European Green Deal, that plan does not contain any clause
that makes the European Union’s emission reduction level contingent on other countries
actions4. The result presented here thus suggests that the European Green Deal may
not provide the correct economic incentives for other regions to follow the European
Union’s lead in achieving net-zero emission. Without the global participation, the
mitigation of climate change impacts will be significantly less than what is suggested
in the previous section. Therefore, the European Union and the United States will
have even less economic incentives to implement the Global Green Deal. Even China,
which prefers the Global Green Deal as we have seen in the previous section, may have
less reasons to do so if not all regions participate in this global effort.
4.3 Global Cooperation using Trigger Strategies
We have seen in the previous section that to encourage global effort in mitigating
climate change it is important for regions to make their emission abatement level
contingent on others’ actions. Such contingency can be communicated and negotiated
through climate treaties. In this section, I will address two questions in order. Can we
improve upon the “‘No Coordination”’ outcome by a properly designed climate treaty?
4Similar observations are made for the announcement of China and the United States.
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If so, can we use the climate treaty to sustain the Global Green Deal?
4.3.1 Theoretical Characterization
The climate treaty here is interpreted as a coordinated and contingent plan regarding
regional emission abatement policies, i.e., a profile of strategies in the game. A chal-
lenge that persists for any global treaty is that it is often difficult or costly to prevent
unilateral withdrawal of a region. Therefore, an essential requirement for the global
climate treaty is that it must be self-enforced, i.e., the profile of strategies must be an
equilibrium. In addition, I am interested in designing a global climate treaty where each
region’s emission abatement policy along the equilibrium path is at some level a∗i (t)
that is higher than the one in the “‘No Coordination”’ outcome, i.e., a∗i (t) > āi(t).
Since we have seen in Corollary 1 that each region will not change from the abate-
ment level āi(t) if other regions’ strategies are history-independent, this implies that
our global climate treaty must have a contingent plan so that each region’s abatement
level is conditional on the preceding game history. In particular, I will first consider




a∗i (t) , if a




,∀i ∈ N. (4.3)
To put it simply, this climate treaty requires each region to meet the target abatement
level a∗i (t) at each time t, and in the circumstance that such requirement is not met by
some region then all regions must withdraw from the treaty indefinitely. If each region
follows this strategy, then the realized outcome of the game will be the sequence of
target abatement levels. On the other hand, a deviation at any time will lead the future
path of the game to that of the “No Coordination” outcome. If this strategy profile
is an equilibrium, then no region would prefer deviation. Therefore, it is implicitly
implied that this climate treaty will improve every region’s welfare compared to the
“No Coordination” outcome if it is indeed an equilibrium. I now provide a necessary
and sufficient condition for this treaty to be an equilibrium.
Lemma 2 In the piecewise-linear formulation of the dynamic game, the strategies de-
scribed in equation (4.3) is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if for each i ∈ N
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(Ci,t − fit(āi(t)) · Ci,t)1−θ − (Ci,t − fit(a∗i (t)) · Ci,t)1−θ
]







Proof. By the One-Shot Deviation Principle, we only need to show that no region
would have an incentive to unilaterally deviate at time t following any game history
at when its own continuation strategy and other regions’ strategies are fixed. Since
Theorem 2 implies that no region would deviate from the abatement level āi(t) when
the game history is not ((a∗i (t0))i∈N , ..., (a
∗
i (t − 1))i∈N), we only need to construct the
condition such that each region i would not deviate from a∗i (t) following the game
history ((a∗i (t0))i∈N , ..., (a
∗
i (t− 1))i∈N).
If region i does not choose a∗i (t) at time t, then all other regions’ continuation
strategies will be history-independent from that period onward. It is then implied by
Corollary 1 that region i may only deviate to the abatement level āi(t), and will not






[(Ci,l − fil(āi(t))Ci,l)1−θ − (Ci,l − fil(a∗i (l))Ci,l)1−θ]







Therefore, we are done.
Condition (4.4) in Lemma 2 states that in order for the global climate treaty to be
an equilibrium the total discounted increase in each region’s abatement cost cannot be
higher than the total discounted benefit of a better climate for that region when all re-
gions meet their target abatement levels. This condition allows us to check whether the
proposed global climate treaty can be supported as an equilibrium given the sequence
of target abatement levels.
To simplify the discussion, I will now restrict our attention to a subset of target
abatement levels. In particular, we will consider the target abatement levels that take
the form
a∗i (t) = āi(t) + λ · (âi(t)− āi(t)), ∀i ∈ N,∀t ≥ t0, (4.5)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is a uniform fractional increase in the abatement levels required for
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each region from the “No Coordination” abatement levels to the globally optimal ones
(i.e., the abatement levels (âi(t))t≥t0 described in Theorem 3). This allows us to use
a single parameter λ to control how much we would like each region to increase its
abatement level in the climate treaty. The next result addresses the case in which the
target abatement levels are restricted to those described in equation (4.5).
Lemma 3 Given the discount factor δ, there exists a value λ̄(δ) > 0 for the uniform
fractional increase such that the strategies characterized by Equation (4.3) and Equation
(4.5) is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if λ ≤ λ̄(δ).
Proof. Let α(λ) represent the profile of strategies described in (4.3) and (4.5) associ-
ated with the uniform fractional increase λ and let us define
a∗i (λ, t) := āi(t) + λ · (âi(t)− āi(t)).
Suppose there exists λ̄ > 0 such that α(λ̄) is a subgame perfect equilibrium. For any
λ < λ̄ and any time t we have



































































[(Yit − fi(āi(t))Yit)θ − (Yit − fi(a∗i (λ̄, t))Yit)θ],
where the first inequality is due to the assumption that the function fi is strictly
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where the second inequality is due to the hypothesis that α(λ̄) is a subgame perfect
equilibrium and condition (4.4) in Lemma 2. Hence the profile of strategies α(λ) is
also a subgame perfect equilibrium by using condition (4.4) again.
Let us define λ̄(δ) := sup Ψ, where
Ψ := {λ ∈ (0, 1]|α(λ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium}.







[(Ci,l − fil(āi(l))Ci,l)1−θ − (Ci,l − fil(a∗i (0, l))Ci,l)1−θ]







By condition (3.29) in Theorem 2, we also have
lim
λ→0




In addition, for any λ > 0 we have


























[(Ci,l − fil(āi(l))Ci,l)θ − (Ci,l − fil(a∗i (εi, l))Ci,l)θ]







Letting ε = mini∈N εi, we can then conclude that the strategy profile α(ε) is a subgame
perfect equilibrium. Since ε > 0, the set Λ must be nonempty and therefore we are
done.
As discussed previously, every region’s discounted payoff will be increased in the
game if the proposed global climate treaty is an equilibrium. Lemma 3 implies that we
can always find a strictly positive value for the uniform fractional increase λ so that the
treaty is indeed an equilibrium. Therefore we have proved theoretically that the global
climate treaty is effective in reducing the global carbon emissions and at the same time
also improves every region’s payoff compared to the “No Coordination” outcome.
A central idea in the literature on standard repeated games is that almost any
desirable outcome can be implemented in an equilibrium by deterring deviations with
sufficient punishment when players are patient enough, i.e., when the discount factor δ
is sufficiently close to one. This insight has been formalized in various versions of Folk
Theorems5. Although the Folk Theorems do not apply here since our game is not a
standard repeated game6, Theorem 4 below shows that, under a certain condition, a
similar result still exists in our game.
5See Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) for an example.
6In a standard repeated game, players’ available actions and payoff functions remain the same in
each period, i.e., it is the same game being repeated. Our game, on the other hand, is not a standard
repeated game because each regions’ payoff functions change with time and with the atmospheric
carbon content level, and the latter of which in turn is determined by regions’ previous actions.
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Then there exists a cutoff discount factor δ̂ such that, for any δ > δ̂ and any λ ∈ [0, 1],
the strategies defined by equations (4.3) and (4.5) form a subgame perfect equilibrium
in the piecewise-linear formulation of the game.
Proof. Fix any region i at any time t. By Lemma 2, the strategies defined by (4.3)






[(Ci,l − fil(āi(l))Ci,l)1−θ − (Ci,l − fil(a∗i (λ, l))Ci,l)θ]







where a∗i (λ, t) = āi(t) + λ · (âi(t) − āi(t)). Letting λ = 1, the above condition is
equivalent to











δk[(Ci,t − fit(āi(t))Cit)1−θ − (Ci,t − fit(âi(t))Ci,t)1−θ].
Under condition (4.6), the right-hand side of the above inequality becomes unboundedly
large as δ approaches one while the left-hand side is always finite. Therefore, there must
exists a cutoff discount factor δ̂ such that for any δ > δ̂ the above inequality holds, i.e.,
the profile of strategies defined by (4.3) and (4.5) is a subgame perfect equilibrium for
λ = 1. Apply Lemma 3 and we are done.
Theorem 4 shows that the proposed climate treaty could potentially achieve the
global optimum when the discount factor is sufficiently close to one. The sufficient
condition (4.6) states that each region’s increase in the abatement cost at time t when
it implements the global optimum instead of the “No Coordination” one is lower than
the decrease in the climate change impacts at time t when all other regions are im-
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plementing the global optimum. Although condition (4.6) is not exactly a necessary
condition, we can verify that if the sign of this inequality is reversed then the global
optimum can never be achieved by this climate treaty no matter how close the discount
factor is to one. One scenario in which this could happen is when a region can sustain
the economic growth (i.e., roughly measured as the increase in Ci,t) at a faster rate
than the increase in climate change costs (i.e., the increase in Bi,t). This is the reason
why Dutta and Radner (2012) argues that it may be hard for fast-developing countries
like China and India to sign a climate treaty that implements the global optimum.
However, in reality each region’s economic growth will likely slow down eventually7.
Another scenario in which the condition (4.6) may fail is when a region has mild climate
change impacts while the emission reduction rate prescribed by a∗i is high. Moreover,
the value of the discount factor may not be arbitrarily close to one when it is estimated
according to the consumption-investment decision as in the climate-economic model.
Therefore, the global climate treaty may not be an equilibrium even when condition
(4.6) holds.
4.3.2 Simulation Results
We have theoretically established the potential of using trigger strategies to support
global climate cooperation. This is accomplished by using the piecewise-linear formu-
lation of the game, however, which imposes assumptions that may not necessarily hold
in reality. I now use simulations of the climate-economic model to investigate whether
trigger-strategies can be used to sustain the Global Green Deal.
Similar to our previous inquiry, most studies8 on trigger strategies in the context of
international climate cooperation focus on “grim” trigger strategies in which all partic-
ipants immediately switch back to the “business as usual” indefinitely once defection
of any kind occurs. As emphasized in Mason et al. (2017), this type of trigger strat-
egy is not robust against renegotiation: the embedded punishment loses its credibility
since starting a new agreement is beneficial for all countries. I therefore start with a
more realistic benchmark trigger strategy in which defection immediately triggers all
other regions to switch to the same emission reduction policy as that of the defecting
region. With this type of trigger strategy, severeness of the punishment increases with
the degree of defection and cooperation by all regions resumes if the defecting region
cooperates again.
7This is true in the CAGE model since each region’s total production is extrapolated based on a
logistic function which will eventually approach a limit level.
8See for example Dockner et al. (1996), Dutta and Radner (2009) and Dutta and Radner (2010).
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Let us begin with the scenario in which a defecting region simply withdraws from
the Global Green Deal without rolling back its achieved progress. Table 4.2 shows that
this benchmark trigger strategy is not effective in sustaining cooperation on the Global
Green Deal. Most regions, except for the two African regions, will halt further progress
before reaching net-zero carbon emission even when other regions are cooperating.
Table 4.2: Defection without rollback under benchmark trigger strategy
Defect when reduction rate reaches: Defect when reduction rate reaches:
United States 0.1 Central America 0.5
Canada 0.1 South America 0.7
Western Europe 0.2 South Asia 0.4
Japan and South Korea 0.1 Southeast Asia 0.7
Australia and New Zealand 0.0 China Plus 0.5
Central and Eastern Europe 0.1 North Africa 1.0
Former Soviet Union 0.3 Sub-Saharan Africa 1.0
Middle East 0.3 Small Island States 0.8
Note: The results are from simulations. The number for each region shows when it will withdraw from the Global Green Deal assuming
all other regions are cooperating before then.
Table 4.2 also shows that the benchmark trigger strategy tends to be more effective
in deterring defection for the regions who suffer more from climate change. This result
demonstrates an important limitation of using trigger strategies to sustain climate
cooperation. The essential idea of trigger strategies in this context is to use a worse
climate, due to less ambitious emission reduction from the punishing regions, as a threat
in order to deter potential defection. However, regions with less economic incentives
to cooperate are often those that are less vulnerable to climate change. This creates a
situation in which the threat imposed by trigger strategies tends to be less severe for
those that are more likely to defect. This situation compromises the effectiveness of
trigger strategies. We can see in Table 4.2 that the benchmark trigger strategy quickly
loses its effectiveness when the Global Green Deal barely starts9.
This result is robust even under more severe punishment. To demonstrate this
point, I consider an alternative trigger strategy in which defection of any kind will
immediately trigger all other regions to roll back their progress by decreasing the
emission reduction rate by 0.05 per year until it reaches zero. This trigger strategy is
more similar to the one that uses “business as usual” as threat against defection. Unlike
the benchmark trigger strategy, the ‘roll-back’ trigger strategy may create scenarios
in which the sixteen regions are implementing different emission abatement levels at
certain times. To study the consequence of heterogenous abatement policies, we need
9For practical purposes, each region is only allowed to defect when the emission reduction rate
reaches 0.1 ∗ n for n = 1, 2, ..., 10 in the simulation. Under a finer increment, Australia and New
Zealand region will defect when the emission reduction rate is slightly above zero.
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to estimate each region’s individual carbon emission in the ‘No New Policy’ scenario.
To estimate the sixteen regions’ ‘No New Policy’ carbon emissions, I extrapolate
their fractions in global carbon emission based on the country-level carbon emission
data for 1965-2018 from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy10 and Marilena
et al. (2018). In particular, the extrapolation of regional emissions is done by using
Ei(t) = fri(t)× E(t), (4.7)
where fri is region i’s fraction of global carbon emissions under the “No New Policy”
scenario. We extrapolate the regional fractions in four steps. In the first step, we divide
the sixteen regions into four subgroups: (1) the “Developed” group (USA, CAN, WEU,
JPK, ANZ and CEE); (2) CHI; (3) FSU and (4) the “Other” group (SAS, MDE, SEA,
CAM, NAF, SAM, SSA, SIS). For each subgroup other than the “Developed”, we use
the least-square fit to a group-specific function. The fraction for the “Developed” group
is simply derived by
frDeveloped = 1− frCHI − frFSU − frOther. (4.8)
Similar exercises are conducted in the remaining three steps. In step two, we extrapo-
late the regional fractions within the “Developed” group. In step three, we put SAM,
SSA, SIS together as the “South” group and extrapolate regional fractions within the
“Other” group. In the last step, we extrapolate regional fractions within the “South”
group. Figure 4.5 shows the extrapolated regional fractions of global emissions.
I now take the United States as an example to demonstrate the effectiveness of the
“roll-back” trigger strategies. Table 4.3 shows that it still does not have the incentive
to delay the defection. In fact, this unconditional ‘rollback’ trigger strategy will induce
the United States to also roll back its own progress in contrast to the benchmark trigger
strategy for which the better option for the United States is to simply withdraw from
cooperation without rolling back its progress.
Table 4.3: Relative social welfare losses for the United States under different trigger strategies.
U.S. withdraws at 0.1 U.S. withdraws at 0.2 U.S. withdraws at 0.1 with rollback
Benchmark trigger strategy 89.07% 89.48% 99.51%
Rollback trigger strategy 100.54% 110.88% 99.51%
Note: The percentage terms are the relative social welfare loss for the United States compared to that in the “No New
Policy” scenario.
10https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.


































































(a). step one: extrapolation for the four subgroups. (b). step two: extrapolation within the ``Developed’’ group.
(c). step three: extrapolation within the ``Other’’ group. (d). step four: extrapolation within the ``South’’ group.
Figure 4.5: Regional fractions of global CO2 emissions under “No New Policy” scenario are
extrapolated using analytic functions in four steps.
I am unable to directly verify whether the trigger strategies described in the pre-
vious section can be used to support the global optimum, since that would require
solving the piecewise-linear formulation of the dynamic game explicitly. These sim-
ulation results nonetheless demonstrate that although in principle trigger strategies
can indeed improve the outcome, their effectiveness in reality may be much less than
expected. The main reason for it is that countries may have very different climate
change impacts as suggested by our model. Consequently, the punishment in trigger
strategies that intends to create a worse global climate as threats may be less effective
in deterring deviations from those who suffer little from the climate change. Through
simulations, we have seen this embedded drawback of trigger strategies significantly
limits the effectiveness of using trigger strategies to sustain global cooperation.
This conclusion can partially explain why the European Union, China and United
States did not make their “net-zero-emission” plans contingent on other countries ac-
tions. Although those plans may not provide correct economic incentives for other
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countries to follow the lead, choosing to make them contingent on other countries ac-
tions instead may not provide sufficient economic incentives either. In addition, the
implicit threat in trigger strategies may be interpreted as noncooperation mindset in
reality and may further hinder global cooperation. Due to these reasons, I conclude
that trigger strategies may not be the ultimate solution to the tragedy of commons
inherent in the climate change problem in contrast to what is often suggested in the
game-theoretic literature11.
4.4 Further Discussion on Trigger Strategies
4.4.1 Regional Climate Treaties
I next consider the possibility for regional climate treaties. Here a regional treaty
is one that includes a subset of the sixteen regions. There are two motivations in
studying regional climate treaties in addition to the global one. The first is that in
reality it may be easier for certain groups of regions to form their own climate treaties
than imposing a global treaty that requires full participation, due to various reasons
that are not included in our model, e.g., due to political reasons or history of conflicts
among regions. Although it may not be optimal from the global perspective, designing
a collection of regional treaties may be a more plausible option.
To investigate the effectiveness of regional climate treaties, I consider the case in
which the benchmark trigger strategies are adopted only among a subset S of regions
such that cooperation continues if and only if all regions in S have been implementing
the Green Deal. Table 4.4 summarizes the simulation results on the effectiveness of
the regional climate treaties. I begin by first excluding the Australia and New Zealand
region who would almost immediately withdraw from global cooperation. Table 4.4
shows that cooperation of the remaining regions can only be sustained until the emission
reduction rate reaches 0.1 by the benchmark trigger strategy, after which four other
developed regions12 will withdraw from cooperation. As we move down the list in
Table 4.4, the remaining regions have increasingly more similar climate change impacts.
However, we can see that reducing heterogeneity in climate change impacts by including
fewer regions does not significantly improve the outcome. The reason is that including
fewer regions in cooperation reduces the effect on the global carbon emissions and hence
reduces the effect on global climate. Therefore, the degree of deterrence, measured by
11See for example Dockner et al. (1996), Dutta and Radner (2009) and Dutta and Radner (2010).
12United States, Canada, Japan and South Korean, and Central and Eastern Europe.
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the social welfare difference between that in the targeted outcome and that in the
punishment phase, shrinks as well as we exclude increasingly more regions. We can
clearly see this point from the last row of Table 4.4. In this case, the remaining
regions13 are those that suffer most from climate change. However, since their total
carbon emission is only about a quarter of the global emission, it is not sufficient for
the trigger strategy to create meaningful deterrence. Consequently, defection occurs
almost immediately.
Table 4.4: Regional cooperation under benchmark trigger strategy
Excluding Fraction of global emission Cooperation sustained until reduction rate reaches: Relative global welfare loss
ANZ 98% 0.10 92.75%
USA, CAN, JPK, CEE 80% 0.10 94.94%
WEU 68% 0.20 92.06%
FSU, MDE 61% 0.25 92.43%
SAS 55% 0.20 94.79%
CHI 26% 0.00 100.00%
Note: The first column shows the regions that are excluded from the previous regional cooperation. The second column are total fractions of
global carbon emission for the remaining regions at the reference year 2020. The third column shows when the regional cooperation stops. The
last column are achieved relative global welfare loss compared to that of the “No New Policy” scenario.
4.4.2 Treaties with “All-or-Nothing” Approach
I now examine the scenario in which the sixteen regions are able to enforce a binding
agreement to support cooperation. Although we have seen examples in the real world
of withdrawing from an international agreement, it is also true that such action may
partially be deterred by non-economic reasons. Studying cooperation under a binding
agreement is thus still relevant. On the other hand, a fundamental requirement for
any international agreement is that it must respect sovereignty of the countries or
regions. In other words, countries cannot be forced to sign the agreement if it is not in
their interests to do so. Although trigger strategies cannot formally be applied for this
scenario, the main idea remains in what I call the “all-or-nothing” agreement: every
region agrees that the agreement is in effective if and only if all regions have signed it.
To demonstrate why a region may choose to not sign a potentially beneficial agree-
ment and why the “all-or-nothing” agreement may be useful and necessary, we use
an example in which cooperation starts with the Asian and African regions together
with Small Island States. For this subset of regions, we find that the “all-or-nothing”
approach can support an agreement in which the target is to implement the Green
Deal until the emission reduction rate reaches 0.4. By comparing the relative social
13Central America, South America, Southeast Asia, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and Small
Island States.
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welfare loss for Central America and South America in the second and the third col-
umn in Table 4.5, we can see that these two regions will not join the cooperation since
free-riding allows them to have lower social welfare loss. However, if the cooperation is
conditional on their participation, then they will sign the agreement to also partially
implement the Green Deal, since they would otherwise lead the world to the “No New
Policy” scenario in which they will have higher social welfare losses. This example
demonstrates that the “all-or-nothing” approach can encourage participation, but the
cooperation must be beneficial to all participating regions compared to the “No New
Policy” scenario.
Table 4.5: Relative welfare losses under agreements that partially implement the Green Deal
plan
Agreements S0 (0.40) S1 (0.40)
Central America’s relative social welfare loss: 81.6% 93.1%
South America’s relative social welfare loss: 86.2% 91.8%
Note: The percentage terms are relative social welfare loss com-
pared to that in the “No New Policy” scenario. S0 =
{SAS, SEA, CHI, NAF, SSA, SSI} and S1 = S0 + {CAM, SAM}.
As we have already seen in the previous section, the Global Green Deal does not
benefit the developed regions and therefore it can not be sustained even when a bind-
ing agreement is available and the “all-or-nothing” approach is applied. In this case,
imposing a uniform fractional increase in emission abatement levels across all regions
may not be the best way to design the global climate treaty. For example, if a region’s
climate change cost is very low while the abatement cost is relatively high, then it is
perhaps better to require a lower fractional increase for this region in the climate treaty.
Therefore, I will also allow each region to be assigned with different emission abatement
targets in the climate treaty. Based on simulations, I find that the best outcome that
can be achieved in this scenario is for the agreement to assign less ambitious emission
reduction targets for all regions instead of insisting on net-zero emission, particularly
for the developed regions as they are significantly less affected by climate change. As
shown in Table 4.6, this second-best cooperation agreement reduces the global welfare
loss to 76.4% of that in the “No New Policy” scenario.
Although this cooperative outcome can achieve a higher global welfare compared to
treaties that impose uniform emission reduction across regions, it relies on two strong
assumptions: (1) a binding agreement is plausible; (2) all regions can agree to continue
with the “No New Policy” emission if one or more regions do not sign the agreement.
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Table 4.6: Emission reduction targets in the “second-best” Global Green Deal
Emission reduction target Emission reduction target
United States 0.3 Central America 0.6
Canada 0.1 South America 0.6
Western Europe 0.3 South Asia 0.6
Japan and South Korea 0.1 Southeast Asia 0.6
Australia and New Zealand 0.0 China Plus 0.6
Central and Eastern Europe 0.1 North Africa 0.6
Former Soviet Union 0.4 Sub-Saharan Africa 0.6
Middle East 0.5 Small Island States 0.6
Relative global welfare loss 76.4%
Note: The relative global welfare loss is calculated by comparing to that in the “No New Policy” scenario.
In addition, the agreement for this cooperation assigns much less ambitious emission
reduction targets for the developed regions, which may be politically controversial to
advocate. Nonetheless, it provides us with a ‘best-case-scenario’ that shows what could
possibly be achieved using the idea of trigger strategies.
4.4.3 The Effect of Altruism
So far we have maintained the assumption that each region’s decision is based entirely
on its own social welfare which in turn is calculated using the global discount factor ρ.
I now investigate the effect of altruism on the results for global cooperation. We now
investigate the effect of two types of altruism in order: (1) altruism of a region towards
the rest of world and (2) altruism of current generation towards future generations.
Altruism towards Other Regions
We have seen numerous examples of countries helping economically less-developed re-
gions through foreign aid, medical support, etc. This shows that each region may
exhibit a certain degree of altruism towards other regions’ social welfare. To investi-




Uj + (1− βi)Ui, (4.9)
i.e., each region assigns a fraction of βi in its payoff on the sum of other regions’ payoffs.
Theorem 5 below shows that although each region may selects a higher emission abate-
ment level in the “No Coordination” outcome due to altruism towards other regions,
the tragedy of commons still exists in the game.
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Theorem 5 Suppose each region i’s payoff function is defined as (4.9) in the piecewise-
linear formulation of the dynamic game. There exists a subgame perfect equilibrium
α = (αi)i∈N where at any time t and after any game history a
t, we have αi(a
t) = ãi(t)
for each region i where āi(t) is the solution of




Assuming equations (3.29), (4.2) and (4.10) all have solutions in the interval (0, 1) for






āi(t) < ãi(t) < âi(t)
Proof. The proof is similar to those for Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 and is thus omitted
here.
On the other hand, the possibility of altruism may potentially affect our conclusion
regarding the trigger strategies. With altruism, the punishment towards unilateral
deviation will be severer since the unmitigated global climate in the punishment phase
decreases the sum of all regions’ social welfare, a fraction of which is now accounted for
in each region’s payoff function. Therefore, trigger strategies become more effective in
deterring unilateral deviation of each region i as the degree of its altruism βi increases.
To demonstrate the quantitative effect of altruism, I use simulations of the climate-
economic model in which I implement the benchmark trigger strategy introduced in
section 4.3.2. Assuming that no other region has deviated from cooperation, Table 4.7
shows when each region would defect under different degrees of altruism.
Table 4.7: Defection rate using benchmark trigger strategy under different degrees of altruism
Degrees of altruism β (%) 2% 5% 10% 20% 40% β (%) 2% 5% 10% 20% 40%
United States 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 Central America 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9
Canada 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 South America 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
Western Europe 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 South Asia 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Japan and South Korea 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 Southeast Asia 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9
Australia and New Zealand 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 China Plus 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Central and Eastern Europe 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 North Africa 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9
Former Soviet Union 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 Sub-Saharan Africa 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Middle East 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 Small Island States 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Note: The results are from simulations. The number for each region shows when it will withdraw from the Global Green
Deal assuming all other regions are cooperating before then.
We can see that a small degree of altruism (i.e., βi = 2% or 5%) postpones each
region’s defection time. For example, the United States with 2% altruism will defect
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when reduction rate reaches 0.4 compared to 0.1 in the benchmark case. This effect is
particularly significant for Canada, Japan and South Korea, and, Australia and New
Zealand. The reason for such strong effect is because these regions’ social welfare
losses (in absolute terms) due to climate change are small compared to the rest of
world. Therefore, a small value for βi is sufficient to deter defection from each of
these regions until the emission abatement reaches a high level. This also explains
why altruism tends to have smaller effect on regions with larger economies such as the
United States, Western Europe and China Plus.
While altruism creates severer punishment in terms of payoffs, it has negligible
effect on the benefit of deviation which is mainly due to decrease in emission reduction
costs. This is why altruism tends to have less effect in delaying defection for regions
with relatively high reduction costs such as Central and Eastern Europe, Former Soviet
Union and Middle East (Figure 4.3).
It is also worth-noting that the delay of defection time may not necessarily be
monotone increasing with respect to the degree of altruism. North Africa, for example,
will reach net-zero emission with no or small degree of altruism but will choose to
deviate from cooperation at the reduction rate 0.9 if its degree of altruism is 20%
or higher. Since North Africa is among the regions that suffer the most from climate
change, it has a strong incentive to mitigate climate changes despite the high reduction
cost. Altruism, on the other hand, would decrease such incentive since the payoff will
now be the weighted average of its own social welfare and the sum of the rest of world’s.
Although we would have a better outcome using trigger strategies when regions
have some degree of altruism, the convexity in emission reduction cost still makes it
challenging to support cooperation that maximizes the global welfare (i.e., a uniform of
0.9 emission reduction rate from all regions as shown in Figure 4.4). For some regions,
global cooperation using trigger strategies requires their degree of altruism to be in
the range of 20% - 40%. It is left for future work to estimate each region’s degree
of altruism based on empirical evidence, but it seems unlikely that any region would
have a degree of altruism higher than 20%. Therefore, our result suggests that using
trigger strategies to support cooperation on deep emission cut may not be so promising.
Moreover, since full emission reduction yields lower global welfare compared to that
from 0.9 global emission reduction (Figure 4.4), no region other than North Africa and
Sub-Saharan Africa would have a incentive to cooperate for the Global Green Deal
under any degree of altruism.
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Altruism towards Future Generations
The discount factor ρ is an important parameter in calculating each region’s social
welfare and it reflects each region’s altruism towards the welfare of future generations.
In the benchmark, we have estimated the value of ρ = 2.3% using the solution of
the background economy (Lemma 1) and historical data. This approach assumes that
each region’s attitude towards the climate change impacts on future generations is
consistent with that in the consumption-investment decision. I now investigate how
different values of ρ would affect the effectiveness of trigger strategies. In particular,










Here, consumption Ci is still calculated as in the benchmark case but each region may
have a different attitude of altruism towards future generations’ welfare represented
by ρi. Assuming the benchmark trigger strategies are adopted and no other region
has defected from cooperation, Table 4.8 shows when each region would defect from
cooperation under different attitudes towards future generations.
Table 4.8: Defection time using benchmark trigger strategy under different discount factors
ρ = 1% ρ = 2.3% ρ = 5% ρ = 1% ρ = 2.3% ρ = 5%
United States 0.3 0.1 0.1 Central America 0.8 0.5 0.2
Canada 0.2 0.1 0.0 South America 1.0 0.7 0.3
Western Europe 0.4 0.2 0.1 South Asia 0.8 0.4 0.2
Japan and South Korea 0.2 0.1 0.1 Southeast Asia 1.0 0.7 0.3
Australia and New Zealand 0.1 0.0 0.0 China Plus 0.9 0.5 0.2
Central and Eastern Europe 0.1 0.1 0.0 North Africa 1.0 1.0 1.0
Former Soviet Union 0.5 0.3 0.1 Sub-Saharan Africa 1.0 1.0 1.0
Middle East 0.7 0.3 0.1 Small Island States 1.0 0.8 0.4
Note: The results are from simulations. The number for each region shows when it will withdraw from the Global Green
Deal assuming all other regions are cooperating before then.
We can see that a lower value of discount factor (i.e., more altruism towards future
generations) postpones the defection time for every region. However, this effect is
far from sufficient to make trigger strategies effective in sustaining global cooperation
on net-zero emission. Even under a reasonably low discount factor14, the developed
regions may deviate from cooperation early. On the other hand, the economically less-
developed regions, other than the two African regions, may also defect early if their
altruisms towards future generations are low.
14The range for the discount factor is usually within 1%-5% in the literature. See Nordhaus (2019)





In this chapter, I study global climate cooperation when monetary payments among
regions are possible. In particular, I consider the use of monetary payments for carbon
trade and for encouraging participation in cooperative global agreements. The basic
idea of carbon trade is to allow the sixteen regions to pay other regions in exchange for
more emission reduction. An important aspect addressed here is to characterize each
region’s incentive for trading carbon emissions when there is no pre-assigned emission
allowance. To address this issue, I will use the “No Coordination” outcome of the
piecewise-linear formulation as the benchmark and theoretically characterize the equi-
librium when carbon trades are utilized. In the second part of this chapter, I consider
the use of transfer payments in a more cooperative setting in which I assume the sixteen
regions are able to form binding agreements that contain monetary payments across
time. Through simulations of the climate-economic model, I will characterize the best
possible outcome that can be achieved in this setting. There are other possible uses of
transfer payments in the context of global climate cooperation. The discussion in this
chapter only highlights some of the more interesting results that are most relevant for
the discussion in this dissertation.
5.1 Carbon Trade
In this section, I discuss whether carbon trade in which regions purchase and sell units of
emission reduction can reduce global carbon emissions and improve the global welfare.
The idea of carbon trade is similar to the cap-and-trade programs with one important
difference. The cap-and-trade programs are usually proposed to be implemented at
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country level for which permits of carbon emission are assigned to firms. In this case,
countries can use regulations, laws and enforcement authorities so that a firm cannot
emit more than its assigned amount of permits unless additional units are purchased
from the program. At the global level, however, there is no effective enforcement
authority that can support this type of emission permits. In this section, I will first
show when and why a region may have incentive to purchase or sell units of emission
reduction without emission allowances and the effect of carbon trade on each region’s
emission level and welfare. Based on the characterized incentives, I then design a set
of rules for a carbon market that facilitates carbon trade so that it decreases the global
carbon emission and increases the global welfare. I will also discuss some unanswered
questions regarding the carbon trade.
5.1.1 Incentives and Effects of Carbon Trade
To focus on understanding the incentives and effects of carbon trade, let us select a
generic region i as the focal point of study. I first study region i’s optimal decision
assuming it is myopic in the sense that it ignores the implication of its own decision
on other regions’ decisions. Specifically, I assume that there is a carbon market that
opens for one period at time t in which region i can purchase or sell units of emission
reduction at a price p ∈ (0,∞) that is treated as exogenously given. In addition, I
assume that region i can purchase any amount of emission reduction from the market
without worrying about whether there is sufficient amount of supply or whether its
purchase may affect other regions’ emission abatement policies. As seen in section 3.4,
reducing the emission by āi(t)Êi,t for region i at time t is supported in equilibrium
before the carbon trade is allowed. Since we are interested in whether carbon trade
can improve the outcome, I also assume that only extra units of emission reduction
beyond āi(t)Eit can be sold by region i in the carbon market, as the starting point.
Given the market price p, let ai(p, t) represent region i’s optimal emission abatement
level at time t and let zi(p, t) represent region i’s optimal net trade in the carbon market,
i.e., region i purchases zi(p, t) units of emission reduction if zi(p, t) > 0, or sells |zi(p, t)|
units if zi(p, t) < 0. Under the previously stated assumptions, ai(p, t) and zi(p, t) must




1−θ (Ci,t − fi(a)Ci,t − zp)
1−θ +
(
aÊi,t + max{z, 0}
)
Bi,t,
s.t. aÊi,t = āi(t)Êi,t + |z|,∀z < 0
and Ci,t − fi(a)Ci,t − zp ≥ 0.
(5.1)
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The objective function represents the change in region i’s discounted total payoff. The
first equation in the constraint assumes that the sale of emission reduction in the carbon
market at time t must be delivered within the same period. The second inequality
in the constraint is simply region i’s budget constraint, i.e., the total spending in
the carbon market cannot exceed region i’s total consumption for that period. This
constraint simplifies problem so that carbon trade does not affect investment in capital
and consequently the future economic production. This assumption is also consistent
with the treatment for the climate-economic model.
Lemma 4 Let (zi(p, t), ai(p, t)) be the solution of the maximization problem (5.1).
There exists a positive value p̂i(t) < f
′
it(āi(t))Ci,t/Êi,t such that
1. For all p ≥ p̂i(t), region i will sell carbon reduction, i.e., zi(p, t) < 0. The optimal






























2. For all p < p̂i(t), region i will purchase carbon reduction, i.e., zi(p, t) > 0 and
reduce its own emission abatement, i.e., ai(p, t) < āi(t). The optimal net trade
zi(p, t) and the optimal emission abatement ai(p, t) can be found by solving
Bit
p






Proof. I first find the local optimums when z ≥ 0 and when z < 0 separately, and
then find the global optimum by comparing these two local optimums.
1. For all z ≥ 0, we can ignore the first constraint in the optimization problem. Let
us define
vBit (z, a) :=
P θi,t
1− θ
[Ci,t − fi(a)Ci,t − zp]1−θ + (aÊi,t + z)Bi,t.
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The function vBit is twice differentiable with respect to a. We have
∂vBit (z, a)
∂a
= P θi,t[Ci,t − fit(a)Ci,t − zp]−θ · (−f ′it(a)Ci,t) + Êi,tBi,t,
and for all a ∈ [0, 1]
∂2vBit (z, a)
∂a2
= −θP θi,t[Ci,t − fit(a)Ci,t − zp]−θ−1 · (f ′it(a)Ci,t)2
+ P θi,t[Ci,t − fit(a)Ci,t − zp]−θ · (−f ′′it(a)Ci,t)
≤ 0,
where the last equality is implied by the budget constraint. Fix the net trade
z ∈ R+, the emission abatement policy a(z) ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes vBi (z, a) can
be found by solving the equation
P θi,t[Ci,t − fit(a(z))Ci,t − zp]−θ · (f ′it(a(z))Ci,t) = Êi,tBi,t. (5.6)
In addition, since for any a ∈ [0, 1] we have
∂2vBit (z, a)
∂a∂z
= −θP θi,t[Ci,t − fit(a)Ci,t − zp]−θ−1(−f ′i(a)Yit)(−p) < 0,
the optimal abatement level a(z) with respect to the net trade is strictly decreas-








= P θi,t[Ci,t − fit(a(z))Ci,t − zp]−θ(−p) + Bi,t







where the last equality is implied by equation (5.6). Since a(z) is strictly de-
creasing in z for all z ∈ R+ and f ′′it(a) > 0 for all a ∈ [0, 1], it follows that
dvBit (z, a(z))/dz is strictly decreasing in z for all z ∈ R+. Therefore, we can
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By the budget constraint, this condition is equivalent to
f ′it(a(0))Ci,t
Êit




− p > 0, (5.7)
where the first equality is implied by equation (3.29) in Theorem 2. When this
condition holds, region i’s locally optimal zB satisfies
f ′it(a(z
B))Ci,t = pÊi,t.












+ (āi(t)Êi,t − z)Bi,t.






























and for all z ∈ R− we can verify that d
2vSit(z)
dz2





= P θi,t [Ci,t − fit (āi(t))Ci,t]
−θ ·
[






= θ [Ci,t − fit (āi(t))Ci,t]−θ · (−p)
< 0,
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where the first equality is implied by equation (3.29) in Theorem 2. Therefore,
























Based on the above derivation, so far we can conclude that region i’s globally
optimal choice is to sell zS units of carbon reduction when condition (5.7) does not





From the above derivation, we can verify that


































By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there thus exists a cut-off price p̂i(t) such that
∆vit(p̂i(t)) = 0. In addition, for all p > p̂i(t) we have ∆vit(p) < 0 and for all p < p̂i(t)
we have ∆vit(p) > 0, and hence we are done.
Lemma 4 shows that region i will always trade emission reduction at the market
for any given price. The decision regarding whether it will purchase or sell and the
amount of trade depends on the price as well as its marginal benefit and cost of emission
reduction given region i’s instantaneous payoff at time t. Figure 5.1 helps us explain
the region’s incentive for carbon trade. Recall that for the “No Coordination” outcome,
each region will implement emission abatement levels such that the marginal benefit
and cost of emission abatement on its instantaneous payoff are equalized. When the
price is relatively high, carbon trade creates economic incentives for region i to increase
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its abatement level so that it can sell extra units of emission reduction at the market
and thus increase its total discounted payoff. Due to the convexity of fit, however,
region i will only increase its emission abatement until the marginal cost of reduction
equals the given price (as shown by the green line in Figure 5.1). On the other hand,
when the price is relatively low, purchasing emission reduction from the market is more
beneficial for region i compared to reducing the emission by itself (as shown by the red
line in Figure 5.1).
z > 0 : purchasez < 0 : sell





Figure 5.1: Region i’s instantaneous payoff at time t at different price level of the carbon
market.
Compared to the cap-and-trade program, region i’s incentive for purchasing emis-
sion reduction is not because it has reached some pre-assigned emission limits but
instead because it can now increase its emission while maintaining the benefits of mit-
igated climate change at a lower cost through carbon trade. This observation demon-
strate an unfortunate side effect of carbon trade: when the market price is at a level
such that region i purchases emission reduction, it will reduce less emission compared
to the “No Coordination” outcome, and hence the global emission could potentially be
increased if we have
[āi(t)− ai(p, t)] · Êi,t > zi(p, t)
Corollary 3 thus contains an important result as it shows that the above situation may
never happen in the piecewise-linear formulation of the game.
Corollary 3 For any market price such that region i purchases emission reduction
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and for the solution characterized in Lemma 4, we always have
zi(p, t) > [āi(t)− ai(p, t)] · Êi,t.
Proof. Let us first define the net global emission reduction when region i purchases
from the carbon market,
e(z) = z − [āi(t)− a(z)] · Êi,t,
where a(z) is the optimal emission abatement level for z ≥ 0 that satisfies equation
(5.6). It is easy to verify that e(0) = 0. Therefore, we will have e(zB) > 0 if we can




Êi,t > 0,∀z ∈ (0, zB).
Since equation (5.6) holds for z > 0, we must have
d
(
P θi,t[Ci,t − fi(a(z))Ci,t − zp]−θ · (f ′it(a(z))Ci,t)
)
dz
= 0,∀z > 0,















Since a(z) is strictly decreasing in z, i.e., da(z)
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+ p > 0,∀z > 0.
On the other hand, based on the proof of Lemma 4, for all z < zB, we have
f ′it(a(z))Ci,t
Êi,t
− p > 0.

















Hence we are done.
Corollary 3 shows that although region i may reduce its own emission reduction, it
will always purchase more emission reduction from the market. We can thus conclude
that trading in the carbon market will always increase the global emission reduction
and Lemma 4 shows that region i will always trade, i.e., we never have zi(p, t) =
0. Therefore, the carbon trade described here always helps reduce the global carbon
emission. In addition, since no trade is always an available option, Lemma 4 implies
that carbon trade always improves region i’s payoff compared to the “No Coordination”
outcome.
5.1.2 A Market of Carbon
Based on the study of a region’s incentive for carbon trade, I now provide a set of
rules for the carbon market and prove that under these rules each region will decide as
described in the previous subsection even when they are not myopic.
Definition 2 The market of carbon M is a market that opens for every period in
which regions trade units of emission reduction under the rules
1. For each time t, a price pt > 0 is determined by an independent organization.
2. The amount of net trade zi(t) is reported by each region simultaneously. If a
region plans to purchase emission reduction (zi(t) > 0), the payment must be
submitted at the same time. If a region i sells emission reduction, i.e., zi(t) < 0,
it must increase |zi(t)| units of extra reduction beyond āi(t)Eit within the same
period.
3. If reported total demand equals total supply, i.e.,
∑
i∈N zi(t) = 0, then transaction
is completed according to the reports.
4. If reported total demand is greater than total supply, i.e.,
∑
i∈N zi(t) > 0, then
transaction is completed according to the reports: (1)regions that sell emission
reduction are required to accomplish the extra reduction at time t; (2) regions that
purchase emission reduction are required to pay the reported amount.
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5. If reported total demand is less than total supply, i.e.,
∑
i∈N zi(t) < 0, then






The design of these rules addresses two main concerns regarding the carbon trade.
The first and the more obvious one is that we need to make sure that under no circum-
stance regions’ reports can potentially change the effective price of emission reduction.
This may not be necessary for all carbon markets but it allows us to use the char-
acterization in Lemma 4 to show the strategic outcome when the carbon market is
available. The second concern is more subtle. Let us consider a specific scenario where
the total reported demand equals supply and region i’s report is to sell |zi(t)| units
of emission reduction. Suppose region i decides to reduce its own reported supply,
the total demand will be greater than total supply. If we replace the fourth rule in
Definition 2 and allow extra payment to be refunded, then there will be at least one
region that purchases less from the market and as a consequence that region will have
a higher emission abatement level1, which indirectly increases region i’s today payoff.
This indirect effect has been ignored when we assume region i is myopic but should be
considered when it is not. Not allowing extra payment to be refunded eliminates this
indirect effect from the game so that we can rely on the solution provided in Lemma
4.
The set of rules in Definition 2 is not the only way to design the market for our
purpose and perhaps it is not the simplest one. But it allows us, through a series of
simple steps, to prove that the solution characterized in Lemma 4 can be supported in
an equilibrium. In the current circumstance, the decision for each region i at time t is
to first choose the net trade report zi(t) and then select the emission abatement level
ai(t). For this reason, I change the notation for the game history to h
t := (at, zt) in
the following result.
Theorem 6 Given the market of carbonM and the solution (ai(p, t), zi(p, t)) described
in Lemma 4, if there exists a sequence of prices (p̃t)t≥t0 such that for every t ≥ t0 we
have ∑
i∈N
zi(p̃t, t) = 0, (5.8)
then there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium α = (αi)i∈N such that for each region
1Although not included in the formal statement, we have shown this in the proof of Lemma 4.
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i ∈ N and after any game history ht we have
αi(h
t) = (ai(p̃t, t), zi(p̃t, t)).
Proof. The functions vBi and v
S
i in this proof are as defined in the proof of Lemma 4.
Let us fix any game history ht. We need to show that region i does not have incentive
to unilaterally change its continuation strategy assuming other regions continuation
strategies are fixed. By the One-Shot Deviation Principle, we only need to show that
region i does not have incentive to deviate from (ai(p̃t, t), zi(p̃t, t)) at time t while
maintaining the future continuation strategy.
1. Suppose we have zi(p̃t, t) > 0.
• If region i deviates to (a, z) such that z > zi(p̃t, t), its total discounted payoff
(evaluated at time t) will be changed by
[Ci,t − fit(a)Ci,t − zp]1−θ + (aÊi,t + zi(p̃t, t))Bi,t − vBit (ai(p̃t, t), zi(p̃t, t))
< vBit (a, z)− vBit (ai(p̃t, t), zi(p̃t, t)) < 0
where the last inequality is implied by Lemma 4.
• If region i deviates to (a, z) such that z ≤ zi(p̃t, t), its total discounted payoff
(evaluated at time t) will be changed by
vBit (a, z)− vBit (ai(p̃t, t), zi(p̃t, t)) < 0,
where the last inequality is, again, implied by Lemma 4.
2. Suppose we have zi(p̃t, t) < 0.
• If region i deviates to (a, z) such that z > zi(p̃t, t), its total discounted payoff
(evaluated at time t) will be changed by
vSit(z)− vSit(zi(p̃t, t)) < 0,
where the last inequality is implied by Lemma 4.
• If region i deviates to (a, z) such that z < zi(p̃t, t), then according to the
market rules, regions i can only sell |z̃| units of emission reduction where
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z̃ = z · w(t) = z ·
∑
j 6=i |min{zi(t), 0}|∑
i∈N max{zi(t), 0}
< zi(p̃t, t).
Its total discounted payoff at time t will be changed by
vSit(z̃)− vSit(zi(p̃t, t)) < 0,
where the last inequality is implied by Lemma 4.
Therefore we can conclude that region i cannot increase its total discounted payoff by
unilaterally deviating from (ai(p̃t, t), zi(p̃t, t)) at time t and hence we are done.
The existence of this subgame perfect equilibrium requires that there is a ‘market-
clearing’ price at each time t. Such a price may not always exists, since each region’s
optimal net-trade function zi is discontinuous at the its cutoff price p̂i(t). As shown in
Lemma 4 and Figure 5.1, region i may choose to switch from selling a positive amount of
emission reduction immediately to purchasing a positive amount as the price surpasses
p̂i(t). Despite this technical issue, we have effectively established a market of carbon
that can indeed reduce the global carbon emission and increase every region’s total
discounted payoff compared to the “No Coordination” outcome for the piecewise-linear
formulation of the dynamic game. However, it is difficult to characterize the relative
performance of this carbon market compared to the climate treaties discussed in the
previous chapter in terms of reducing global emission and improving global welfare
since it requires us to solve the piecewise-linear formulation of the game explicitly.
This study is left for future work.
5.1.3 Discussion
Throughout the previous discussion, we have set a threshold emission reduction level,
i.e., āi(t)Êi,t, for each region so that it can only sell extra units of reduction beyond
this level. My initial intention was to make sure that at least when a region sells in the
carbon market it will reduce more emission compared to that in the “No Coordination”
outcome. Since we have proved that the overall emission reduction still increases even
when a region purchases from the market, it is thus worth asking whether this threshold
is still necessary. Expressed more generally, how does the threshold affect the carbon
trade and does there exist an optimal level for it? To answer this question I need to
prove whether Corollary 3 is still true when we change the threshold. An alternative
approach is required in this case since a key step in the proof of Corollary 3 uses the
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fact that the threshold is at a level for which each region’s marginal benefit and cost of
emission reduction are equalized. On the other hand, if we can prove that this result
is still true, then based on the derivation I will then be able to show that decreasing
the threshold increases the global emission reduction and welfare.
The second question is whether we can enhance the benefit of the carbon market
by a slight modification of the current rule. One example is that we may require a
region to pay some fixed entry fee before it is allowed to purchase emission reduction
and this entry fee is used to fund more supply in the market. This modification will
strictly increase the global emission reduction and welfare as long as all regions still
enter the carbon market. This condition is satisfied for small enough entry fees since
we have already shown that it is strictly better for each regions to participate in the
market. We can thus construct a result that computes the optimal entry fee for each
region at time t and calculate the increase in the global welfare.
Moreover, I have ignored the indirect effect where the sale of emission reduction
may change the purchasing region’s emission abatement policy, and I have deliberately
designed a set of market rules to eliminate this effect. It is thus interesting to see
how this effect will change the carbon trade decision. This question is also relevant in
reality. For example, what if the United States and European Union decide to bypass
the global carbon market and directly trade emission reduction? Will they be willing to
do it? If so, what will happen in terms of the emission abatement policies and welfare?
Analyzing a trading mechanism for all sixteen regions seems challenging but perhaps
we can study the carbon trading between two regions using the simplest bargaining
mechanisms.
All these questions are planned for the future work as each of them may require us
to fundamentally change the approach that has been used here. These questions also
demonstrate that the topic on carbon trade is rich and there is still a lot of topics that
can be explored for the purpose of encouraging global cooperation on climate change
mitigation.
5.2 Transfer Payments
In addition to the carbon trade, transfer payments among regions can also be used
to encourage participation in the global effort for mitigating climate change. In this
section, I use simulations of the climate-economic model to address the question, Can
transfer payments support the Global Green Deal? The answer to this question is
important as we have already seen in the previous chapter that the Global Green Deal
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may not be effectively sustained by using trigger-strategies only.
In this section, I will restrict the transfer payments in monetary term. I first char-
acterize the required monetary payments assuming binding agreements are available.
In particular, we use mi,t to represent the net monetary payment received for region
i at time t. To simplify the discussion, I assume that these payments will not affect




i (t) +mi,t. (5.9)
Here, C∗i is the solution to the optimization problem (3.7), and is determined by the
sixteen regions’ emission reduction policies.
If we include monetary payments in a binding agreement to support the Global
Green Deal and the alternative is the “No New Policy” outcome, then each region i
















Here, Ĉi and C
GGD
i are consumptions in the ‘No New Policy scenario and in the Global
Green Deal, respectively. Notice that the social welfare for the Global Green Deal with
transfers, or the right-hand-side of the above condition, is continuous with respect to
the net payments received (mi,t)t≥t0 . Therefore, we only need to consider the case in
which each region receives a fixed amount of net monetary transfer across time, i.e.,
mi,t ≡ m̄i.
Table 5.1: Minimum net monetary transfer (Billions of 2020$) required for participation
Global Green Deal 74% Green Deal Global Green Deal 74% Green Deal
United States 355.0 177.4 Central America 1.6 -7.4
Canada 63.4 32.3 South America -20.3 -24.7
Western Europe 233.2 99.5 South Asia 19.0 -20.7
Japan and South Korea 56.1 27.7 Southeast Asia -55.1 -66.4
Australia and New Zealand 41.4 22.6 China Plus -11.3 -115.0
Central and Eastern Europe 199.6 105.8 North Africa -138.1 -117.1
Former Soviet Union 130.3 47.0 Sub-Saharan Africa -242.1 -197.8
Middle East 66.9 17.7 Small Island States -2.7 -2.9
Global toal 696.9 -21.7
Note: Monetary payments are measured by billions of purchasing-power-parity adjusted US dollars in 2020.
Table 5.1 shows the results based on simulations of the climate-economic model.
The first column shows the minimum net transfer payments required for each region to
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be willing to participate in the Global Green Deal, with negative numbers interpreted
as the maximal amounts of money those region would be wiling to pay for the Global
Green Deal. We can see that the world will need an average of 696.9 billions of dollars
per year to support the Global Green Deal. If there is no external funding and thus
the global budget of the agreement cannot be in deficit, then the best outcome that
can be sustained is for all regions to implement the Green Deal until the they reach
74% emission reduction. This result is obtained by iterative simulations of the climate-
economic model in which I incrementally decrease the long-term target of emission
reduction.
I now discuss why a binding agreement to enforce the transfer payments may be
necessary. When monetary transfers can be enforced through a binding agreement, how
they are distributed across time will not affect each region’s incentive for participation.
However, for the cooperation on emission reduction, the benefits of improved climate
are distributed across a long-period of time due to the long-last impact of carbon
emission on the climate. On the other hand, the costs of emission reduction must
be paid immediately. This suggests that there may be budget imbalance at the early
stage of cooperation. Consequently, it requires that either some regions are willing to
postpone receiving the payments or some regions are willing to temporarily pay more
than the realized benefit from cooperation. As shown in Figure 5.2, cooperation on
the Green Deal until emission reduction reaches 74% will create a long period of time
where the benefit of cooperation, in terms of consumption, is lower than the total net
transfer payment. Without a binding agreement to enforce transfer payments, it would
difficult for any regions to postpone receiving payments. Therefore, although transfer
payments can achieve the best cooperation outcome so far, both in terms of global
welfare and in terms of the global emission reduction, a binding agreement to enforce
payments is likely required.
Despite being the best outcome in terms of climate change mitigation shown in
Figure 5.3, the use of monetary transfer payments causes an additional issue. In order
to encourage global participation, the economically less developed regions are required
to make transfers to the developed regions. This is politically controversial and is likely
to be treated as being unfair in the real world. This issue may partially be mitigated if
we consider the possibility of altruism described in section 4.4.3. Figure 5.4 shows for
each region the required net transfer payments to participate the Global Green Deal
under different combinations of altruisms towards other regions and towards future
generations. We can see that it is possible that for each region there exists some



















































Figure 5.3: Global mean temperature increase under “No New Policy” scenario (purple dashed
line), cooperation among developing regions sustained by trigger strategies (blue line), global
cooperation with binding agreements and “all-or-nothing” approach(red line), global coopera-
tion sustained by monetary transfers (orange line), and the Global Green Deal (green dashed
line).
order to participate in the Global Green Deal. This result shows the importance of
objectively measuring each region’s degree of altruism. Further work is needed in order
to draw a more definite conclusion regarding the plausibility of using transfer payments
to encourage global cooperation.
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Figure 5.4: Required net transfer payments (Billions of 2020$) under altruism to participate




I have constructed and estimated an integrated model of global climate, regional
economies and strategic interaction regarding the regional CO2 emission reduction poli-
cies. Combining theory and numerical simulations, I have investigated the economic
incentives for global cooperation on climate change mitigation and the associated con-
sequences on the future climate. The global cooperation on achieving net-zero CO2
emission by mid-century cuts the global welfare loss by 35% compared to the “No New
Policy” scenario, and it is particular beneficial for the economically less-developed re-
gions.
However, cooperation on net-zero carbon emission suffers from the “tragedy-of-
commons” problem. Although international agreements using trigger strategies can
partly mitigate this problem, they are not sufficient to deter unilateral deviation be-
fore net-zero emission is accomplished. Transfer payments can also be used to achieve a
better outcome either through facilitating carbon trade or through encouraging partic-
ipation in cooperation with binding agreements. However, it does not provide sufficient
incentives for net-zero carbon emission either and the best possible outcome is to ac-
complish about 74% global carbon emission. In addition, using transfer payments may
create political issues since it asks the economically less-developed regions to make
transfer payments to the developed regions. The effect of altruism may resolve this
issue but further work is needed in order to draw a definite conclusion.
The study presented here suggests that it may be difficult to accomplish the goal of
the Paris Agreement for limiting global temperature increase under 2 ◦C which requires
global cooperation on achieving net-zero carbon mission by mid-century. Alternative
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Table A1: List of countries in the sixteen geographic regions.
Region Name ISO
USA United States ASM GUM MNP USA
CAN Canada CAN
WEU Western Europe AND AUT BEL CYM CHA CYP DNK FLK FRO FIN FRA DEU
GIB GRC GRL VAT ITA IMN LIE LUX MLT MCO MSR NLD
PRT SHN MAF SMR ESP CHE TCA GBR WLF
JPK Japan and South Korea JPN KOR
ANZ Australia and New Zealand AUS COK NZL NIU TKL
CEE Central and Estern Europe ALB BIH BGR HRV CZE HUN MKD MNE POL SRB SVK SVN
FSU Former Soviet Union ARM AZE BLR EST GEO KAZ KGZ LVA LTU MDA RUS TJK
UKR UZB
MDE Middle East BHR IRN IRQ ISR JOR KWT LBN OMN PSE QAT SAU SYR
TUR ARE
CAM Central America BLZ CRI SLV GTM HND MEX NIC PAN
SAM South America ARG BOL BRA CHL COL ECU GUY PRY PER SUR URY VEN
SAS South Asia AFG BGD BTN IND PAK LKA
SEA Southeast Asia BRN KHM IDN LAO MYS MMR PNG PHL SGP THA TLS VNM
CHI China Plus CHN PRK MNG
NAF North Africa DZA EGY LBY MAR TUN ESH
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa AGO BEN BWA BFA BDI CMR CPV CAF TCD COG COD CIV
DJI GNQ ERI ETH GAB ETH GAB GMB GHA GIN GNB KEN
LSO LBR MDG MWI MLI MRT MOZ NAM NER NGA RWA SEN
ZAF SSD SDN SWZ TZA TGO UGA ZMB ZWE
SIS Small Island States AIA ATG ABW BHS BRB BMU BES VGB COM CUB CUW DMA
DJI GNQ ERI ETH GAB ETH GAB GMB GHA GIN GNB KEN
DOM FJI PYF GRD GRD GLP HTI JAM KIR MHL MUS FSM
NRU NCL PLW PRI REU BLM KNA LCA VCT WSM STP SYC
SXM SLB TON TTO TUV VUT VIR
Note: Countries and other UN reporting units are represented by the International Standards Organization (ISO) code: https://www.iso.org/
publication/PUB500001.html, accessed December 15, 2019.
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A.2 Parameter Values for the Climate-Economic
Model
Table A2: Parameters and the associated values for in carbon and heat balance equations
Symbol Value Units Description
α1 0.37 - Pre-industrial atmospheric retention fraction of carbon emissions
α2 0.59 TtonneC Pre-industrial atmospheric carbon content
α3 0.50 - Ocean mixed layer CO2 saturation parameter
α4 1320 years Atmospheric carbon clearance timescale
α5 24.1 (W/m
2) yr/◦C Thermal inertia constant
α6 5.35 W/m
2 CO2-driven radiative forcing parameter
α7 0.63
◦C/(W/m2) Climate sensitivity
Table A3: Parameter values for εn, νn and ζi in climate change impact assessment
n: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
εn - - - - 0.31 - -0.15 -1.00 - - - - -1.58 -0.42 -2.65 -0.51
νn - - - - - - 138.60 - - - - - 30.00 - 16.00 -
Region: USA CAN WEU JPK ANZ CEE FSU MDE CAM SAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SSA SIS
ζi 0.80 3.00 1.96 1.01 4.01 2.07 1.47 1.59 0.43 2.23 0.96 1.42 1.19 1.57 1.31 3.12
Table A4: “No New Policy” carbon emission parameters and the calibrated values
k bk1 (GtonneC/yr) bk2 (Julian year) bk3 (yr) Description
1 2.598 2003 162.8 Land use long term trend
2 0.966 1993 15.2 Land us change pulse
3 18.25 2011 29.3 Reference industrial emission
4 11.90 2014 29.4 Industrial fluid fossil
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Table A5: Parameter values for ci,k in climate change impact assessment
k: USA CAN WEU JPK ANZ CEE FSU MDE
1 -.00079 -.00249 -.00147 -.00026 -.00111 -.00175 -.00212 -.00095
2 .01882 .12107 .01704 .00783 .07069 .06152 .08877 .03643
3 -.00647 -.01981 -.00761 -.00269 -.01707 -.01684 -.02714 -.01062
4 .01320 .00902 .02596 .00914 .04682 .02562 .02696 .01733
5 .00192 .00039 .00088 .00150 -.00444 .00194 -.00075 0
6 .00019 .00004 .00009 .00015 -.00048 .00021 -.00008 0
7 -.03290 -.02884 -.03414 .00016 .00015 -.03440 -.03106 -.06408
8 .27674 .24680 .15804 .13493 .09660 .29902 1.14978 .13456
9 -.12088 -.10734 -.21562 -.01671 -.01187 -.10723 -.41189 -.13388
10 -.14389 -.12778 -.12765 -.01989 -.01414 -.12765 -.49032 -.15937
11 -.00012 - .00018 -.00021 -.00028 -.00063 -.00003 -.00027 -.00006
12 -.00001 0 0 -.00011 -.00658 0 0 -.00037
13 -.01427 -.01570 -.00594 -.00340 -.00033 -.00713 -.07341 -.01109
14 -.00254 -.00261 -.00098 -.00025 -.00012 -.00131 -.01162 -.00025
15 -.00001 -.00001 -.00005 -.00060 -.00002 -.00007 -.00004 -.00593
16 -.00916 -.00017 -.00015 -.00265 -.00160 -.00004 -.00018 -.00002
k: CAM SAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SSA SIS
1 -.00176 -.00080 -.00029 -.00009 -.00028 -.00149 -.00125 -.00117
2 .08670 .00727 .01337 .00444 .01806 .06216 .07176 .03081
3 -.02240 -.00514 -.00333 -.00140 -.00528 -.01880 -.01638 -.00571
4 .06197 .04154 .00836 .00923 .01667 .02931 .04207 .05542
5 .00061 .00084 .00297 .00304 .00585 0 .00036 0
6 .00007 .00009 .00035 .00032 .00059 0 .00004 0
7 -.06595 -.07115 -.06707 -.14010 0 -.43965 -.17835 -.06687
8 .24589 .26098 .19457 .38741 1.81056 .00973 .00416 .24143
9 -.14193 -.18005 -.21778 -.43402 -1.38006 -1.29171 -.58148 -.16589
10 -.06378 -.06534 -.14026 -.07142 -.05267 -.08266 -.42247 -.08140
11 -.00037 -.00045 -.00033 -.00044 -.00011 -.00019 -.00078 -.00064
12 -.00041 -.00010 -.00034 -.00497 -.00004 -.00035 -0.00119 -.02098
13 -.07772 -.07062 -.01927 -.01482 -.00069 -.15122 -1.94971 -.1046
14 -.00104 -.00010 -.00092 -.00069 -.00029 -.00150 -.00991 -.00171
15 -.00152 -.00129 -.00110 -.00074 -.00005 -.07587 -.46381 -.02272
16 -.01157 -.00013 -.01064 -.00363 -.00485 -.00001 -.00106 -.04317
Table A6: Global constants and calibrated values for the background economy
Symbol Value Units Description
ω 0.675 - Labor share of production
θ 1.345 - Consumption elasticity of marginal welfare
ρ 2.300 % Social discount rate
r 0.106 - Capital depreciation rate
Note: Parameter values of the above global constants are the mean values
of data-calibrated probability distributions provided in Singer et al. (2008).
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Table A7: Regional parameter values for the background economy
Symbol B0,i B1,i B2,i B3,i b0,i b1,i b2,i b3,i
Units Billion Billion Julian year yr k$US2020 k$US2020 Julian year yr
USA 0.0010 0.4522 1982.04 44.02 3.37 153.87 1998.14 43.37
CAN 0.0008 0.0554 1992.18 39.86 2.97 82.90 1975.32 33.53
WEU 0.1351 0.3234 1937.36 42.13 4.59 64.81 1972.69 25.00
JPK 0.0409 0.1354 1949.36 19.56 1.83 55.08 1975.20 16.85
ANZ 0.0004 0.0534 2010.73 42.80 8.24 93.49 1992.35 31.11
CEE 0.0372 0.0838 1912.67 30.06 2.44 34.41 1972.69 25.00
FSU 0.0537 0.2680 1941.58 36.37 2.41 23.50 1956.21 23.93
MDE 0.0254 0.5195 2008.89 23.72 2.31 42.36 1980.67 31.80
CAM 0.0080 0.2442 1997.62 25.62 2.05 22.84 1961.90 30.50
SAM 0.0099 0.5485 1988.54 27.41 1.60 26.48 1972.23 38.53
SAS 0.2222 2.4358 2002.58 25.36 1.39 67.38 2037.35 17.60
SEA 0.0406 0.9610 1997.18 30.64 1.21 47.62 2016.63 21.10
CHI 0.3947 1.1402 1975.03 17.19 0.80 62.60 2016.54 12.64
NAF 0.0107 0.3977 2022.74 31.18 2.07 31.80 2005.46 41.72
SSA 0.0643 4.9353 2057.89 29.54 1.06 2.89 1955.06 42.35
SIS 0.0045 0.0604 1983.17 30.69 1.62 25.01 1984.56 39.11
Note: k$US2020 represents one thousand purchasing-power-parity adjusted US dollars in 2020.
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